

SECRET

Stage II - Planning

Objectives

What do we wish to accomplish?

- A. What are the attitudes of the government and people of India towards the East-West conflict?

India's attitude toward the East-West conflict is fundamental to its general foreign policy. The continuance of this policy appears to be based on two main considerations. First, there is the basic desire that India, having achieved independence, should never allow itself to come under the influence of another power. The government is accordingly determined to resist being influenced by either the United States or the U.S.S.R. and to steer as independent a course as possible in international affairs. Secondly, India's policy of nonalignment is fostered by the general fear of involvement in a third world war and the recognition of the country's exposed position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Thus the policy of nonalignment is in part based on the belief that India can not rely upon the West to defend South Asia against direct Soviet attack and on the recognition that India's limited resources and industrial strength preclude a defense establishment of the size necessary to defeat such an attack. Furthermore, the fact that the Soviet Union has not directly intervened in South Asian affairs has apparently encouraged the hope that, in the event of a third world war, Soviet action would be directed westward towards Europe and the U.S. and eastward towards China, Korea, and Japan, leaving India on the periphery of the struggle. The result is that there is a fairly common tendency in the government and among educated Indians in general, to believe that it would be folly to avow or publicly encourage anti-Soviet sentiments which might provoke their powerful neighbor.

There are other subsidiary motivations in India's policy of nonentanglement. Prime Minister Nehru apparently believes that a neutral India in conjunction with other Asian and Near Eastern countries can exert a greater influence in world affairs and contribute to world peace by acting as a mediating influence rather than joining one of the "power blocs." Finally, there is the possible consideration that India's influence is greater as a politically neutral nation than as another member of a coalition.

Indian leaders insist that India's policy is a positive and internationalist one and not one of passive neutrality, and point out that in contrast to the failure of the United States to join the League of Nations, India has participated in almost every phase of international organization since 1945. Furthermore, they stress that the policy of nonentanglement does not mean that India considers each bloc or nation as equally responsible for world tensions. In September 1951 Madame Pandit, former Ambassador to the United States and sister of Prime Minister Nehru, expressed India's appreciation for the U.S. wheat loan and stated that India is pro-United Nations and pro-free nations. She added

SECRET

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State Department review completed

SECRET

- 2 -

that in the fifth General Assembly of the UN, India voted with the United States 38 times, abstaining on 11 occasions and voted against the United States only twice.

The form of India's political institutions, its international trade, the possible sources of investment capital and technical aid, and the training and inclination of many of its leaders dispose India more to the Western nations than to the Soviet Union. Since 1951 a developing fear of Soviet aggressive designs and of Soviet-inspired subversion, an increased concern over the intentions of Communist China, and a subsidence in some of India's fears of the United States have tended to make India noticeably more sympathetic with the West. But in the Indian Government's view the basic considerations which determine India's policy have not changed usufficiently to make an open re-orientation of policy necessary or desirable. Barring a major change in the balance of power or in the present defense position of the subcontinent India can be expected to continue to try to maintain its middle course between the two power blocs. (55-26,27). This position on East-West tensions causes the Indians often to express disappointment in the UN which they feel has become little more than a forum to air East-West differences. (42-23)

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

State II

A-1. How do they view the present global East-West tension?

The fervent nationalism aroused during the course of the struggle to gain independence together with a certain amount of anti-Western and anti-white sentiment has resulted in a widespread conviction among politically conscious elements that India, as one of the leading nations of Asia and the Near East, should chart the most independent course possible in the field of international affairs (55-1).

With some exception Indians are opposed to joining either side in the conflict between Western powers and the Soviet bloc. They want to be free and independent and choose own role as crises arise. (42-23)

There is no probability that within the foreseeable future India will abandon its policy of non-alignment in the East-West conflict. Nor does any alteration in any of India's basic foreign policies appear likely with the possible exception of its China policy which might be abandoned should action by Red China convince the Indians of the hopelessness of trying to wean China away from the Soviet bloc.

SECRET

SECRET

- 4 -

Stage II

A-1-a. Do they see it resulting from a conflict of principle, a desire for power, aggressive tendencies, fear of aggression, or from other forces?

The educated, sophisticated Indians tend to view East-West tensions as primarily a power politics struggle between the power blocs for world domination.

Indians doubt that US efforts to unite the free world under its leadership are motivated solely by a desire to help the nations resist Communist aggression. Rather Indians see in them an attempt to extend US power and influence and to acquire allies against a powerful rival and potential enemy with whom the US is engaged in a struggle for first place among the nations of the world. Indians hold that the US shares responsibility with the USSR for present cold war tensions and believe that the US approach to the present world situation is excessively "military" and belligerent and that US policies in the main tend to heighten rather than relax them, thereby increasing the danger of a world war.

SECRET

SECRET

-5-

Stage II

A-1-b. What possible developments of the situation do they fear and what do they think the actual course of developments are likely to be?

They fear that war will break out and result in their involvement and result in their involvement and bring to an end their plan for economic betterment and the strengthening of internal political unity. (42-23)

SECRET

SECRET

- 6 -

Stage II

A-1-c. Where do they think their own interests lie in the situation?

They think their own interests lie in remaining neutral and in seeking to avoid war and always to be independent and choose their own solutions to crises as they arise. They also seek to attain a leadership role in South and Southeast Asia and to a lesser extent in the Near and Middle East and Africa in drawing together and influencing a bloc of third-power or neutral nations to offset the balance of military power developing between the free nations and the USSR.

SECRET

SECRET

-7-

Stage II

A-2. Do Indians understand the threat of communism?

Statements of Indian leaders indicate an increasing awareness of the threat from the north. (81-15) Efforts are being made to strengthen the northern frontier defenses.

Indian strategists recognize that the Himalayas cannot provide an impenetrable defense against a determined invasion from the north and that the sizeable manpower resources which enabled the country (exclusive of that portion which is now Pakistan) to mobilize an army of about 1.5 million men during World War II are more than offset by the serious lack in up-to-date weapons and equipment, in mechanized forces and air power and in the substantial industrial development required by modern war. (55-1) Despite its policy of friendship with Communist China, India since the invasion of Tibet, has become increasingly sensitive to, and apprehensive of, the growing danger of Communist infiltration across its northern border and in the adjoining states of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan with whom India has special relations. As a result, the Nehru Government has made efforts to strengthen the country's northern border defenses and bolster up its weaker northern neighbors.

While India's top political leaders are ".....sympathetic with socialist objectives, and show no consternation at communist ideology per se, they have all demonstrated their opposition to the Communist Party, both for its violence and for its subservience to the party's foreign ties .....From 1948 to 1951, when mass violence was the policy of the Communist Party of India, thousands of Communists were jailed." (59-1)

While the Government of India and the Congress Party may somewhat underestimate the threat of Communists within the country, they are not unaware of it. The CPI is kept under surveillance and the government is prepared to take prompt and vigorous action against subversive, illegal or violent Communist activities.

The Congress Party government has begun to recognize the danger of Communist exploitation of the poverty stricken voter and that time is likely to play into the Communists' hands unless some other group can demonstrate its ability to improve the general lot. To counter Communist activities the government is continuing a policy of strict repression of all acts of subversion or violence, has begun to expose and denounce Communist claims and pretensions as well as the party's foreign allegiance, and is concentrating

SECRET

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SECRET  
- 8 -

its available financial resources on a development plan that is primarily aimed at agriculture. The main weakness of the government's program is its lack of measures especially designed to counter Communist activities among the vulnerable student and discontented middle-class groups, or to bridge the wide gap existing between the largely urbanized intellectuals, who provide the political leadership of the country and the mass of the general population. (55,5)

SECRET



SECRET

- 9 -

Stage II

A-2-a. Do Indians think the Communists intend to take over their country?

Coupled with the recognition of the weaknesses in India's military position is the rather general belief that Soviet aggression is primarily directed against the West and against northeast Asia, i.e., against China, Korea and Japan. The result is that there is considerable feeling in India that it would be folly to antagonize close and powerful neighbors and provoke an attack which might otherwise be avoided. Reinforcing these strategic considerations are important psychological attitudes developed during the long struggle for independence. (55-1) In general they do not believe the Communists plan to take over the country by massive aggression but rather by internal subversion and a nibbling away at the weak border states.

The capabilities of Soviet Bloc countries for influencing the Government of India are extremely limited. The presence of two powerful Communist states for all practical purposes on India's border is, of course, a fact that India cannot, and does not, ignore, and is one of the various factors which lead India to follow a policy of non-alignment in the East-West struggle. But if it is favorable to the Soviet Bloc to the extent that it tends to reinforce Indian neutralism it is also unfavorable inasmuch as it tends to increase India's fear of Communist aggression and hence to take counter measures against it. Any definite attempt at intimidation along India's northern border, short of preparations for a large-scale invasion, would result not in a move toward accommodation on the part of India but in a stiffening of India's attitude toward the Soviet Bloc. Indians in general, however, not only feel that they are remote from the USSR but also are prone to regard the Himalayas as constituting an effective barrier against any potential invasion.

SECRET

SECRET

- 10 -

Stage II

A-2-b. What confidence have the Indians that they can resist Communism?

The program ["one-stage" socialist revolution through violence] launched by the Indian Communists ushered in an era of armed communist insurrection, sabotage, and terrorism from 1948 to 1950 .....While the communists caused extensive destruction, the effect on the CPI itself was disastrous. Government action was prompt and vigorous. Hundreds of party members were killed in armed clashes with the government forces, thousands were arrested, others were kept under close government surveillance, and the party was banned in several states .....; membership had fallen from an estimated 90,000 in 1948 to below 30,000." (53-24) The government's success in suppressing this violence has given Indians the confidence they can prevent the domestic Communists from over-throwing the government by violent revolution.

SECRET

SECRET

- 11 -

Stage II

A-2-c. Do Indians think that Communism threatens their ideals, aspirations and way of life?

While India's top political leaders are ".....sympathetic with socialist objectives, and show no consternation at Communist ideology per se, they have all demonstrated their opposition to the Communist Party, both for its violence and for its subservience to the party's foreign ties ....." (59-1) Thus the international character of Communism runs counter to nationalist sentiments and the ready resort to violence to achieve their ends is repugnant to the passiveness of the Gandhi-influenced Indians. It is not Communism per se which they fear as they have a strong faith in the validity of strength of their own cultural and religious traditions. It is rather the fear that the Communists will be able to acquire dangerous mass strength in India by exploiting economic and social dissatisfactions before the present Government is able to effect an improvement in living conditions through its own programs.

SECRET

SECRET

-12-

Stage II

A-2-d. To what extent do Indians see through communist professions, such as being "for the people", and communist misrepresentation of the West?

Actually there is little first-hand knowledge of the U.S.S.R. or of Russians by Indians, and only a handful of Indians have ever visited Russia. (42-21)

The general ignorance of the USSR, coupled with Soviet indirect methods of subversion through Asian nations and the prevalent suspicion of Western colonial and ex-colonial powers leads to the tendency of many Indians to accept Soviet propaganda claims that the Western nations are imperialistic and that the U.S.S.R. is anti-imperialistic and interested only in promoting the aspirations for freedom and a better life of the common people everywhere. (42-22) There has been evidence in recent years that many literate Indians are becoming more suspicious of the claims of the U.S.S.R. to being the great "working class democracy." However, the greater sympathy of most Indians for Communist China as a fellow Asian nation, makes them more susceptible to Chinese Communist professions and sympathetic to the anti-Western misrepresentations of the Peiping regime.

SECRET

SECRET

-13-

Stage II

A-2-e. Is the Indian view of communism distorted by expectations that it might be potentially beneficial to them, as offering speedy solution for social and economic problems and enabling India to develop into a strong and powerful nation?

Many Indians accept Soviet and Chinese Communist propaganda at face value. They are interested and impressed by the claims of economic progress and industrialization in both countries. Faced by similar problems of industrialization and improvement of agriculture Indians are curious to find the key to the USSR seeming success and China's apparent progress. (42-21,22) While they have little interest in or use for the power-seeking and control tactics of the Communist parties and governments and look on Marxism as an outmoded philosophy, they embrace state socialism as the quickest method to improve the national welfare.

Partially as a result of their Asian consciousness, Indians have tended to be more receptive to Chinese Communist than to Russian propaganda in this field. Non-Communist Indian visitors to the USSR tend to compare the Russian standard of living and industrial accomplishments with those of other Western countries, to the disadvantage of the Soviets. Communist China's accomplishments, however, are generally compared to India's achievements. Since Indian visitors to China are, of course, shown the most dramatic examples of the "New China's" progress, the comparison is generally favorable to the Communist regime. Furthermore, the Chinese Communists have systematically promoted the idea that India and China, the two under-developed giants of Asia, are facing many similar problems and have offered India the benefit of their experience in tackling some of these problems. Chinese Communist propaganda in India stress the progress made under the Communist regime in development, industrialization and social welfare, leaving the impression with many Indians that China is making far greater strides in tackling its problems than is democratic India.

The Appeal of Certain Communist Ideas and Ideals

In contrast to the suspicions and fears aroused by industrial capitalism in South Asia, Communist ideas and ideals have considerable appeal since there is no experience with communism in action. Communism's emphasis on the problems of the peasant and the worker and its advocacy of production for the common good are particularly suited to a region where the preponderance of the population depends on agriculture, where standards of living are pitifully low, and where the peasant and the worker have long been the forgotten men of society. The subordination of the individual to the community, which is resented in the more individualistic societies of the West, conforms to existing social traditions in India; furthermore, the dangers of government interference in village life are generally concealed by emphasis on such popular slogans as "Land to the Tiller" and "No Rent" campaigns. At the same time, the communist idea of a planned economy also has a considerable attraction for many conservative leaders who are seriously concerned over the backwardness of their countries and who

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SECRET

SECRET

-14-

tend to feel that the best hope of achieving any substantial or rapid development lies in some type of Five Year Plan adapted from the Soviet model. Finally, Communist ideals of a classless society, of comradeship without regard to color, and of the abolition of imperialistic exploitation have a particular appeal to nationalists and would-be reformers, who in the course of the recent political struggle for independence have already discovered the handicaps to political unity and economic progress resulting from divisions of class or caste, have become particularly sensitive to racial discrimination, and have no faith in the type of Western business imperialism made familiar during the period of British rule. Although Soviet action in Eastern Europe has convinced many South Asian leaders of the expansionist tendencies of the USSR, and although the subversive tactics of the local Communist parties have forced repressive action in India and Pakistan, nevertheless much of the literate opinion in the area still views Marxian analysis with considerable respect and regards many of the alleged objectives of Communism as distinct from the power ambitions of the Soviet Union and the actual practice of local communist parties. Prime Minister Nehru of India has also pointed out that although his government could not tolerate the violent and subversive tactics of the local Communist Party, he is favorably impressed by many of the ideas and ideals of Communism, while India's ambassador to Yugoslavia has confidentially indicated to US representatives that he believes India could learn much from that country now that its ties with Moscow have been cut.

At the time of India's independence there was a great deal of Indian interest in Soviet achievements. The speed with which the Soviet Union industrialized a backward and predominantly agricultural economy to convert itself into a first class world power in less than 30 years had aroused considerable interest among educated Indian circles in the USSR and Communism. It was felt that the problems confronting India of a peasant and illiterate population living under a strongly traditionalistic social system were very similar to those tackled by the Soviet Union at the end of World War I. Prior to independence Indian interest in Soviet achievements had acquired a strong nationalist tinge as a result of the restrictions placed by the British Government of India on Indian contacts with the USSR. In Indian eyes a visit to the Soviet Union tended to take on the aspect of a patriotic gesture of defiance of British authority. Many educated Indians resented what they considered to be officious British efforts to control what Indians should see or think, adopting the view that the people of every nation have the right to make their own investigation of any problem that is of concern to them and to come to their own decisions. Both the restricting and the consequent difficulties of first-hand observations produced a marked tendency to note only the positive achievements of the USSR and to give the Soviets the benefit of every doubt. This tendency was reinforced by the USSR's public championing of the nationalist movements in Asia in the 1920's and 1930's.

Since independence, however, India has been able to get a better look and many of her expectations over what was to be learned from the Soviet experiment have been giving way to growing disillusionment. Some visiting Indians have

been

SECRET

~~SECRET~~  
-15-

been taken in by the "red carpet" treatment accorded them in the USSR but a few of the more discerning have noticed the Soviet limitations placed on efforts to make first-hand observations, or to get information on Soviet discoveries and techniques. Indian leaders are still trying to gather information on Soviet achievements and experience that might be of use to India. However, they repeatedly note the great human cost of the Soviet gains, clearly indicating that India does not consider such methods acceptable. Indian leaders, having decided in favor of institutions of representative and responsible government, are openly critical of the authoritarian nature of the Soviet system.

Growing Indian awareness of the limitations and costs of Soviet achievements has been accompanied by an increasing suspicion of Soviet political objectives. There is still widespread Indian belief that the USSR has serious reasons for wanting to avoid a world war. The wartime losses of the Soviet Union are thought to have left that country with a determination to delay involvement in a third world war so that it might devote itself to consolidating its position in Eastern Europe and to strengthening its outer defenses. The fact that the USSR has not attempted the direct military conquest of any weak countries on its southern border and refrained from sending Soviet troops into Korea appears to encourage the Indian belief that the Soviet Union is not prepared to risk a third world war. However, a number of Indian leaders are becoming increasingly aware of the expansionist nature of Soviet aims and the USSR's effort to extend its power and ideology. Prime Minister Nehru has confidentially indicated that he has grave apprehensions concerning Soviet intentions. Distrust of Soviet intentions has also been growing among educated Indians as the propagandistic nature of the Soviet "Peace" campaign and the "behind-the-scene" role of the USSR have become more obvious. Indian leaders have not relished the strong and bitter attacks by Radio Moscow in the past calling them the "tools of US and UK imperialism." The increased suspicion of the USSR has also been aggravated by the disruptive role played by the Communist Party in Indian politics, especially from the end of 1947 up through early 1951. Many Indians have been alienated by the Party's method of operation and its past program of violence, and the Indian Government has become increasingly aware of the international character of the party and its threat of subversion. In contrast to the formally correct attitude of the Government of India toward the Soviet Union, is the determination with which it has put down all attempts at subversion and disruption by the Communist Party of India.

Indians have if anything shown more interest in the Chinese revolution than in the Russian revolution. Despite the personal friendship existing between Nehru and Chiang Kai Shek and Nationalist China's support of India's freedom struggle, Indians regarded the Nationalist Government as a corrupt and inefficient government under foreign domination and enjoying little or no popular support. They looked upon the revolution as a fight between a revolutionary force based on popular support and discredited foreign dominated government completely isolated from the people. The Indian attitude toward the Chinese Communists was influenced far more by their sympathy with them as a popularly supported and anti-colonial nationalist group than by the fact that they were Communists. Indians are by no means of one mind regarding Communism but

SECRET

SECRET

-16-

but even among those opposed to Communism there are probably few whose dislike for it is as strong and deeply rooted as their hatred of colonialism.

The Government of India has expressed the belief that the genuinely nationalistic component of the Communist Chinese revolution is as important as the Communist element so that even if the new government retains a Communist ideology its nationalistic element probably will ultimately oppose subservience to the USSR. It is believed that if the Mao government were assured of non-Communist aid and support it would be encouraged to resist Soviet pressure and domination and eventually to follow an independent policy. In this hope, India has followed the policy of extending such aid and support to Communist Chinese Government. Being of the opinion that the Chinese Nationalist Government was clearly repudiated by the Chinese people, and that the present Communist regime is based on popular support, India was one of the first nations to recognize the Communist Government of China. India also recognizes Communist China's sovereignty over Formosa. India has also been a prominent supporter of Communist Chinese demands for UN membership, arguing that it not only has a right to be there but that in any discussion of Asian and particularly Far Eastern problems a nation of the size and strength of China cannot properly be ignored. India was delighted to see Communist Chinese participation in the Geneva Conference.

While India has made an effort to see a favorable side of Communist China, certain things have made this difficult and at the same time embarrassed India. India can rationalize some of the Chinese expansion which has brought China into conflict with non-Asian powers. China's military occupation of Tibet has strained India's determination to see the favorable side of China. India recognized China's suzerainty over Tibet but expressed the hope that Tibetan autonomy would be respected. Communist China, however, brushed aside India's sentiments in a brusque manner and with an air of superiority. While continuing to make a supreme effort to understand China's position and motives and to express confidence in her, India takes steps to protect her own interests. The present Indian regime has been displeased by the "peace" campaign in which China joins with the USSR and which deals in terms of abuse and conflict which Indians believe decrease the chances of peace rather than increasing them. Indians have also disliked the Chinese effort to exploit cultural exchanges between India and China for political ends.

There has been a tendency to believe that China has made rapid progress toward agricultural reform and industrialization under the new regime, some Indians even being under the impression that the progress in China has been greater than in India. However, the Government of India has taken strong exception to the idea that China is making greater strides than India. Moreover, there is a growing popular awareness of the limited nature of many of the apparent gains in China and the costs in personal freedom and regimentation at which they have been made.

Dissatisfaction with conditions of life in India is an important factor favorable to the spread of Communism in India. Such dissatisfaction, already marked under the British, was aggravated after independence was

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SECRET



SECRET

-17-

achieved in 1947 by the failure of the new government to make easily perceptible progress toward solving the basic problems of mass poverty and the particular economic hardships of the middle classes.

Although the poverty of the Indian agricultural and urban laboring groups provides a basis for Communist propaganda activities, political consciousness (and hence more or less clearly articulated attitudes toward the USSR and China) is limited mainly to the urban middle groups. Within this element of the population, the group most attracted to Communism consists of those educated for white collar jobs who have been unable to find appropriate work, and of students training for white collar jobs, which are far from readily attainable. In addition to being economically frustrated, this group tends to be cut off from the age-old cultural and religious patterns of the country, which have been undermined by the Western concepts long taught under the British and subsequently in the Indian universities and schools. However, these Western concepts -- e.g., individualism and the "rational" rather than traditionalistic determination of courses of action -- have not been fully absorbed and made the basis for a new way of life. Thus the "Western" educated in India often tend to be in a sense "cultureless" seekers after a satisfying ideology. Communism for some is the answer. It is not intellectually demanding, as it purports to answer every question, but is demanding of commitment, service, sacrifice, and secrecy, and hence appeals to those who are floundering in a social and moral vacuum: Some of these join the Party; an infinitely greater number stop short of active participation but are influenced by the same factors to a generally favorable and uncritical attitude toward the Communist Party in India, and perhaps more so toward Communism abroad.

While many Indians are drawn toward Communism, or sympathy for it, largely in reaction to their own social maladjustment and malaise, a large number (perhaps a majority of the politically conscious) are sympathetic toward it, or tend to discount criticism of it, because of more general factors. Widespread ignorance of the actual situations in the USSR and Red China make it easier to believe the representations of the Soviet and Chinese propagandists and their local Communist counterparts. But the Soviet Union and Red China also enjoy certain more tangible advantages over the West. The USSR is considered closer to Asia in its problems and policies. It is known to include Asian peoples, and in the 1920's and 1930's publicly championed nationalist movements in Asia. By aid to the Communists in China and other Asian insurgents in the 1940's and early 1950's it weakened Western control (or influence) in Asia. That this aid might manifest a new imperialism was obscured for many Indians by their tendency to identify "imperialism" almost exclusively with that of the Western powers. Also tending to obscure the nature of Soviet imperialism is the fact that it operates largely through Asian nationals. Many Indians tend to accept Soviet propaganda claims that while the Western nations are imperialistic the USSR is anti-imperialistic and interested only in promoting the aspirations for freedom and a better life of the common people everywhere.

SECRET

SECRET

-18-

Stage II

A-2-f. Do they think, or tend to think, of Communism as the wane of the future or inevitable?

They do not as yet look upon Communism as the wave of the future or as inevitable.

SECRET

SECRET

-19-

Stage II

A-2-g. What knowledge and understanding have Indians of Communist history, with special regard to the treatment of satellites?

Such views as the educated Indians have with respect to the role of the satellites in the Soviet "Empire" is submerged beneath their overwhelming consciousness of imperialism being essentially a Western European historical force born of the rise of capitalism. Hence, their inability to detect imperialist expansionist forces in socialist economies which result in a degree of naivete or purblindness which precludes an objective appraisal of Soviet and Chinese Communist goals and zig-zagging tactics to achieve those goals.

However since 1950 there has been a growing suspicion of Soviet intentions indicated by a perceptible tendency of the press to be openly critical of the political objectives and tactics of world communism and of the Soviet Union. This has been in part stimulated by the appearance of informed accounts of Soviet tactics in Eastern Europe. Objective information on Soviet tactics of subversion and control in East Europe and elsewhere are in demand on the part of editors, members of parliament and other public leaders.

SECRET

SECRET

-20-

## Stage II

### A-3. What do the Indians think of the West?

India's top political leaders have a hyper-sensitive aversion to anything associated with colonialism coupled with a distinct fear of the capitalism and materialism of the West. (59-1) Nevertheless since 1950 there has been a growing awareness of Soviet and Communist objectives and tactics coupled with a growing demand for economic aid which has led the Indians to be less critical of the West and to adopt more "plague-on-both-your-houses" attitudes accompanied by a realistic policy of seeking material aid from both sides and by playing one off against the other to strengthen their "neutral" role in world affairs.

Criticisms of Western democracy in action are directed to its economic rather than its political aspects. The introduction of industrial capitalist enterprise and western concepts of private ownership of land have altered the old village economy, displaced handicraft workers and encouraged the growth of city slums. Because private British commercial interests in South Asia resulted in colonial domination Indians have long regarded private capitalism as closely linked with imperialist exploitation. Capitalism's emphasis on competition, and on the production and acquisition of material goods are in conflict with some of the most fundamental ideals of Buddhism and Hinduism.

India's concern over colonialism is well illustrated by Prime Minister Nehru's many policy statements asserting nationalism to be the single most important force in Asia today, that most of the strength of Communism lies in its ability to exploit these nationalist sentiments and that if the West wants the cooperation of Asia it cannot afford either to ignore the political awakening of the people or to buttress reactionary or feudal regimes (i.e., Korea, French Indochina, Formosa) which no longer command popular support. Resentment of the West also finds its roots in the feeling that the white races discriminate against the colored peoples of the world. ~~There~~ Press comment on Marshall Aid for Europe emphasized the large amount US was prepared to spend on Europe in contrast to the negligible amounts made available for Asia. Use of atomic bombs in Japan and later talk of its use in Korea caused the editor of a Bombay publication to state: "Asian lives do not seem to be as sacred as the European ones. Think of all the indignation that the mere mention of poison gas aroused in the world (European) wars and the feeble .... protest which the Truman threat of infecting untold millions of innocent dumb Asians with radioactive poison has aroused ....."

Indians fear to let Western capital come in lest they lose control of their economy, yet they need the economic help of the West.

SECRET

SECRET

-21-

Stage II

A-3-a. How do Indians assess Western objectives, intentions and capabilities towards the Communist bloc countries?

India interprets efforts to organize the free world for defensive purposes as attempts by the US and the UK to win non-Soviet Bloc countries as allies in their power struggle with the USSR, and holds the view that such a course endangers world peace.

SECRET

SECRET

-22-

## Stage II

A-3-b. What do Indians think of collective security measures involving association with the West?

They hold that efforts of the US and UK to organize the free world as attempts to secure allies in support of a power struggle which is a danger to world peace.

The concept of collective security appears to the Indian as essentially mistaken one and they would prefer to substitute the concept of "collective peace." Particularly unacceptable to the Indians are regional defense organizations involving Asian countries (e.g., MEDO, the more recent northern tier, and the Manila Pact) since these directly challenge the Indian hope of creating a "third area of peace" -- i.e., a group of Asian nations under Indian leadership not committed to either side in the cold war.

### The role of India in the UN

An important cornerstone of India's foreign policy is the promotion of its aims through the United Nations. India views the UN as a forum for the exchange of widely divergent national views and as an instrument for the amelioration of conflicts and their settlement by peaceful means. India has been one of the most active states in the UN, and has been active in many of its agencies.

India served on the Security Council in 1950-51 and on the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) from 1949 through 1951. It belongs to all the existing specialized agencies, though it never joined the former International Refugee Organization.

India is represented on the following bodies:

Committee for Information on Non-Self-Governing Territories  
Korean Reconstruction Agency  
Headquarters Advisory Committee  
International Law Commission  
General Assembly Ad Hoc Committee on Administrative Unions  
(of trust and non-self-governing territories)

In addition, India was a member of both the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments during its tenure on the Security Council. It also served on the United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK), and ECOSOC's Commission on the Status of Women and the former Economic, Employment and Development Commission. Finally, as of June 1952, Sir Bengal N. Rau was serving as a judge on the International Court of Justice.

East-West

SECRET

SECRET  
-23-

East-West Conflict in the UN

India has consistently favored a conciliatory role for the UN in dealing with international disputes and has opposed stress on military aspects. Reversing a stand it took in 1947, India has for several years favored admission of all applicants for UN membership. India has supported the West on a number of important issues, and has voted with the Soviet Union only infrequently, but where there has been a direct power conflict between the two blocs, particularly if the use of force has been involved, India has generally abstained from voting.

At the Fifth General Assembly in 1950 India abstained on the overall Uniting for Peace Resolution which authorized the measures by which the General Assembly could resist aggression if the Security Council was prevented from acting because of a veto. In support of its abstention India observed that "in the present international situation the creation of a United Nations force would emphasize the compulsive rather than the mediatory function of the United Nations and would, therefore, not help in the creation of a proper psychological atmosphere for the preservation of peace." Similarly, although India abstained on the section of the resolution creating a Collective Measures Committee (CMC) to study methods which might be used to strengthen international peace and security it also abstained on Soviet motions to delete this provision. India, however, was prepared to support the section which established a Peace Observation Commission which has functions of investigation and fact-finding, and also, to accept membership on the Commission. Again, in the Sixth General Assembly, India abstained on the resolution upholding the report of the CMC on the grounds that it might increase East-West tension. It abstained in committee on every paragraph but also abstained on a Soviet move to abolish the Collective Measures Committee.

In 1949, India supported the Fourth General Assembly's resolution "Essentials of Peace," which called on all members to support the work of the UN, settle their disputes peacefully, cooperate toward regulation of armaments, and exercise their national sovereignty jointly to the extent necessary for the international control of atomic energy. Although India had previously supported the UN plan for the effective control of atomic weapons, it now favors only those resolutions or parts of resolutions on which the Great Powers have agreed. Thus, at the Sixth General Assembly India abstained on the western resolution for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments, while favoring the creation of a new, single Disarmament Commission. India also abstained on the Soviet allegations that the United States was intervening in Soviet internal affairs under the terms of the U.S. Mutual Security Act of 1951 which authorized the use of funds to facilitate service in NATO forces by refugees from beyond the Iron Curtain. India recorded another abstention on the Western move to appoint a commission to investigate the possibility of holding free elections in all of Germany as a necessary step to the reunification of that country. Though not objecting to the goal of unity per se, India, in line with its attitudes favoring Great Power reconciliation, has taken the view that the commission proposal, in the face of Soviet opposition, would not advance a solution of the German question.

SECRET

-24-

India has often joined in efforts to replace the Chinese Nationalist delegation to UN bodies. It believes the UN's failure to seat the Communist Chinese regime is a major factor contributing to existing world tensions. The high mark of these efforts was in the Fifth General Assembly when India introduced a resolution favoring admission of the Chinese Communist regime to UN membership. Sixteen nations supported the resolution, 33 opposed it and there were 10 abstentions. India then headed a Special Committee to study the question of Chinese representation which was unable to come up with an acceptable proposal.

On the issue of Korea India favored the initial establishment of a UN Temporary Commission when this question arose in 1947, voted for its continuance in 1948, and its extension and enlarged authority in 1949 when India became a member. India's presence on this body helped ensure the acceptability of the commission's report clearly exposing North Korean aggression in June 1950. As a Security Council member India supported the finding of aggression and also upheld the resolution calling for assistance in repelling the invaders.

India made no military contribution to the Korean war but it did send a medical detachment. It strongly opposed the UN decision to cross the 38th parallel and abstained on the General Assembly resolution for the unification of Korea which implicitly authorized this step. Following Communist China's intervention, India rapidly assumed the role of peacemaker between the belligerents. On India's initiative 13 Asian and Arab states proposed a three-man cease-fire group which the General Assembly accepted. The Indian co-sponsored proposal for a Far Eastern conference for peaceful settlement of "existing issues" was not adopted. However, India's UN delegation chief, B.N. Rau, served on the cease-fire group which drafted a statement of principles for a Korean settlement, but this effort was dropped following Peiping's criticism of the proposals in the press and over the radio.

Consistent with its efforts to win over the Peiping regime to a position of neutrality, India opposed the February 1, 1951, General Assembly resolution condemning Communist China as an aggressor. It subsequently abstained on the May 18, 1951 vote when the Assembly recommended an embargo on strategic materials to Communist China and North Korea. In reporting to the UN following the adoption of the embargo, however, the Indian Government pointed out that the resolution would not affect India as there was no trade with China in strategic items, and that India already had prohibited the re-export of these items on the basis of its own domestic needs. India, however, was agreeable at the Sixth General Assembly to postponing consideration of the Korean question pending a truce or other developments and supported a resolution to that effect.

#### Leader of Arab-Asian Bloc

India has emerged as the leader of a group of Asian and Arab states which, in addition to the Arab States, generally includes Afghanistan, Burma, Indonesia, and Pakistan. The members of this group share a broadly common outlook,

SECRET



SECRET

-25-

vote together on a number of international issues, and have cooperated to work out certain policies or lines of action in the UN. The members, to varying degrees, have adopted a policy of noninvolvement in the East-West conflict, tend to envisage conciliating and nonmilitant functions for the UN, oppose "colonialism" and "imperialism", and seek economic assistance for their nations' development.

#### Position on Colonial Issues

In line with its strong views on colonialism India has taken an active interest in colonial questions before the UN, generally supporting the principle of self-determination as recommended by the Sixth General Assembly for inclusion in any Covenant of Human Rights. In January 1949 it sponsored the Asian Conference at New Delhi which urged the UN to take steps to ensure Indonesian independence. The vigorous stand taken at New Delhi contributed in no small measure to the ultimate independence of Indonesia.

India has served as a prominent member of the Committee for Information on Non Self-Governing Territories and has sponsored resolutions in several sessions of the General Assembly looking to the political, economic, social, or educational betterment of dependent peoples. It has steadily sought to extend the authority of the UN in this field, one example being its unsuccessful effort at the Second Assembly in 1947 to seek the conclusion of trusteeship agreements for all colonial territories. It was one of the leaders of the Arab-Asian bloc which pressed for discussion of the Moroccan situation at the Sixth General Assembly and of the Tunisian question by the Security Council in April 1952. When these endeavors were rebuffed Prime Minister Nehru gave public notice of the importance he attached to the UN assurance of at least the opportunity to discuss colonial issues.

The disposition of Italy's former African colonies greatly interested India and it took an active role in the UN discussions. In the spring of 1949 it opposed the Bevin-Sforza plan for the division of Libya which was eventually rejected. It then supported the Fourth General Assembly's decision to establish an independent Libya by 1952 and subsequently favored the other arrangements for the colonies. These included a 10-year Italian trusteeship in Italian Somaliland and an Eritrean-Ethiopian federation, scheduled to be effective in September 1952.

#### Position on Human Rights

India's deep-rooted opposition to various forms of racial and other discrimination is strikingly illustrated by the question of the treatment of Indians and other groups in the Union of South Africa. India has annually attacked in the UN what it considers to be blatant racialism practiced by the government of the Union of South Africa, and has pressed the Union government

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SECRET

SECRET

-26-

to delay implementation of its discriminatory Group Areas Act, but to no avail. In taking a generally restrained and responsible approach, however, it has supported recurrent efforts to arrange for a round table conference of India and Pakistan with South Africa. The conference has not yet materialized, and the Sixth General Assembly recommended that a three-member commission be established to facilitate negotiations and called on the Union of South Africa to suspend enforcement of the Groups Areas Act. India was a co-sponsor of this resolution.

India's concern over the racial discrimination practices of the Union of South Africa has been a fundamental motivation in the Indian efforts to have it made accountable to the UN for the administration of South-West Africa. India considers that this former mandate should become a trusteeship under the UN.

In line with its advocacy of nondiscrimination, India has been actively represented on the Commission on Human Rights.

#### Position on Economic Development

As a country anxious to emphasize its independence but which is in great need of foreign technical and financial aid, India is among those favoring greater assistance through the UN, rather than through bilateral channels. This was demonstrated most vividly at the Sixth General Assembly when India supported the U.S.-opposed proposal that the Economic and Social Council submit plans for establishing a special fund for grants-in-aid and long-term loans to underdeveloped countries. India had long favored such a development fund and has twice proposed that moneys saved by disarmament be applied to economic development. It is an active participant in the UN's Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and recently increased its own contribution to that program for 1952.

SECRET

SECRET

-27-

Stage II

A-3-c. Does concern over political and economic imperialism color Indians' attitudes toward the West?

India's top political leaders have a hyper-sensitive aversion to anything associated with colonialism (59-1).

This aspect has been set forth above under question A-3, p.20. In brief this concern lends color to all Indian thinking and consequent attitudes toward the West.

SECRET

SECRET  
-28-

Stage II

A-4. What do the Indians think of the United States?

There is a definite ambivalence in attitude toward the United States. Educated Indians know that the U. S. Government on a number of occasions showed interest in seeing the U.K. make concessions to the Indian nationalists. President Roosevelt personally pressed Prime Minister Churchill on this subject. The shipment of wheat .... to India, the Point IV aid and the Ford Foundation activities in India can also be expected to have a beneficial effect on the relations of the two countries. On the other hand many Indians tend to be suspicious of U.S. intentions and to believe that the United States is taking on the role and international policies formerly associated with the U.K. They suspect an indirect policy of economic penetration and control. Asia is back of India's alarm over the retention of U.S. bases and U.S. military expansion in the Pacific. (42-22)

They believe U. S. is aiding France (December 1951) in retaining colonies in North Africa and is complacent about colonialism in order to maintain allies in Europe to counter the USSR. The difference between U.S. economic and military aid to Europe and that made available to Asia is also resented. They are sensitive on race issue, Indian newspapers feature episodes involving race friction in the U.S. and they have the idea that all Negroes are grossly mistreated everywhere in the U.S. The advanced character of U.S. economic and technological progress causes Indians to feel U.S. is not the country to look to for clues to the solution of her difficulties. They are inclined to believe that the U.S. is completely materialistic in outlook and is accordingly lacking in artistic achievement and cultural interests. (42-23)

Policy toward the United States

India's policy toward the United States has been conditioned by the same general factors which have determined the policy of nonalignment and by certain Indian concepts of the United States. The immense power of the United States together with the fear that the United States has certain imperialistic policy objectives, particularly in Asia, are perhaps the two most important factors responsible for Indian suspicions and fears of the United States. The development of the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union together with the conflicting interpretations of U. S. policy objectives appearing in the U.S. press have made Indians apprehensive that the United States might fail to show restraint in using its newly won power, causing a general conflagration that India believes can be avoided. This basic suspicion may be attributed partly also to the fact that the rise of U.S. power during World War II paralleled the decline in British power with the result that much of the anti-Western and anti-imperialist feeling which developed during the period of British rule has now been shifted to the United States. Many Indians have been fearful that the United States, as the successor of the U.K. and France to a position of world prominence, would become the defender of the status quo in Asia and would prevent the full expression of Asian nationalism. Suspicion was reinforced when the Indians interpreted certain U.S. actions in Asia as evidence of indifference towards nationalist movements, namely, an apparent

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SECRET

-29-

initial delay in backing the Indonesians against the Dutch in 1949, continued recognition of the Chinese Nationalist government after what most Indians believe to have been a clear shift in popular Chinese support to the Communist regime, and in Indochina, the support of Bao Dai, whom the Indians consider an obvious French puppet. They have also resented what they believe to be inadequate U.S. support of efforts by African and Near Eastern nations to end colonial rule. Closely related to this as a cause of anti-U.S. sentiment is India's strong emotional concern over racial discrimination. The common Indian belief that racial discrimination is widespread in the United States has led many Indians to think that the United States, desiring to continue "white man's rule," is refusing to give any but token support to Asian and Near Eastern nationalist movements.

Many Indians have also tended to believe that the United States has considered affairs in Asia and Africa of secondary importance to Europe where relatively larger sums have been spent in economic and military aid.

Another cause of misunderstanding has been India's fear of U.S. economic domination. Indians have been deeply concerned that a more subtle economic imperialism might replace the imperialism just ended. Indians commonly identify American capitalism with Indian capitalism which has generally been less responsible, more exploitative, and similar to nineteenth century capitalism in the West. Socialist and doctrinaire Marxist criticisms of capitalism are familiar to educated Indian circles where there is general ignorance of the positive achievements of American capitalism. Accordingly, many educated Indians favor some form of socialist approach to economic problems. They tend to fear that a capitalistic United States may not only be unsympathetic to this view but might prefer that Asia be exploited by being forced to remain a producer of raw materials and a market for Western surplus manufactured goods.

In some respects since the first years of independence there has been an increase in Indian understanding of US motives and actions and some Indian fears and suspicions have been reduced. Government and business alike now generally recognize that U.S. capital is not clamoring to invest in the country, and, in addition, are beginning to realize that if India is to make any significant economic progress it will require outside investment. Indian governmental statements that nationalization is not now contemplated were in part designed to encourage American investment and by the spring of 1952 several contracts with U.S. firms had been signed. Some Indian government leaders are beginning to feel that the U.S. Government may have a sincere interest in aiding India's welfare and development. This change in attitude can be primarily attributed to the \$160,000,000 U.S. loan for the purchase of grain in 1951 during the acute grain shortage in India and the evident concern of both U.S. officials and ordinary citizens to be of help. Other factors influencing this change has been the implementation of the Point IV program and a sympathetic and enthusiastic interest shown by U.S. Ambassador Bowles in the Indian government's efforts to tackle the difficult economic problems confronting the country.

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SECRET

-31-

Stage II

A-4. What do the Indians think of the West?

India offers a considerable number of factors which are either themselves directly favorable to the US or which provide opportunities for exerting a favorable influence. Among these is the fact that India is a free and independent nation whose government and people are strongly desirous of preserving that independence. Also favorable is the fact that India is a republic with a constitution strongly reflecting the liberal democratic tradition of Great Britain and the Western democracies. These traditions are, moreover, the dominant political ideology not only in government circles, and the Congress Party, but among educated Indians generally. Closely connected with the foregoing is the British influence on Indian education and the fact that many educated Indians have studied in Great Britain and the United States. Nehru's student years at Harrow and Cambridge left him with a deep-rooted respect for England's humanist tradition, history, and legal and political institutions. The cultural transfusion effected by Western education is a highly significant point of contact between India and the West and is undoubtedly one of the factors accounting for the close and friendly relations that now exist between India and the UK. The extensive use of English among educated Indians which has been fostered by British educational influence is another important bond between India and the UK as are also India's membership in the Commonwealth of Nations and the strong economic ties between the two countries. The common cultural heritage from Great Britain shared by India and America forms an important basis upon which to build Indo-American friendship.

India's membership in the UN and the strong support given the UN concept by Nehru and the present Government of India are further factors favorable to the US despite the fact that there is some criticism of the US role in the UN. Indians sometimes accuse the US of trying to dominate the UN and of ruling to make it an implement of American foreign policy,

The present Government of India, although it refuses to align India with the West and follows a foreign policy which in important respects clashes with that of the US, is nevertheless in several other respects favorable to US interests. It is reasonably strong and stable. It has a forward looking program of social and economic reform. It is strongly anti-Communist at least so far as domestic Communism is concerned and although tending to discount the threat of aggression from Communist China and the USSR it is not unaware of their expansionist tendencies. It desires to remain on good terms with the US as with all foreign powers and while urging the development of self-reliance on the Indian people has nevertheless thankfully accepted US economic and technical assistance. It is probably from the point of view of US interests the best government at present possible in India.

The fact that Nehru so completely dominates the Government of India and is virtually the sole author of Indian foreign policy though hardly to be claimed as a favorable factor in view of his antipathy by and large to American and Americans, his misgivings regarding American aims and motives, and

SECRET

SECRET  
-32-

and his intense opposition to US cold war strategy and tactics, provides an unusual opportunity for influencing Indian foreign policy in a direction favorable to our interest. To effect a change in Indian foreign policy, it is necessary and sufficient to convince Nehru that such a change is desirable. The adroit cultivation of Nehru by a skillful American diplomat could probably do much to improve Indo-American relations and increase American influence on the Government of India. Another factor favorable to the US is its long record of humanitarianism. Indians are appreciative of our capacity to respond generously to appeals for aid made in behalf of people in disaster-stricken areas at home and abroad, as for example, the relief extended to India during its great famines near the turn of the century, the vital relief aid to the USSR Ukraine in 1921-22, and the long-term low-interest wheat loan to India in 1951. While Indians tend to find many deficiencies in the American character, they look approvingly upon our warmheartedness, generosity, and ability to get things done.

In the economic sphere there are a number of factors favorable to the achievements of US objectives in India. India's need for economic development is both widely recognized and strongly desired. The Government of India has laid great emphasis on economic developments and has given wide publicity to its economic development programs -- the First and Second Five Year Plans -- with a view to arousing popular enthusiasm and support. These efforts have had considerable success. The First Five Year Plan which is now three years along was well conceived and although it got off to a slow start is now making satisfactory progress. Indians recognize their need of improved agricultural and industrial techniques and know-how and in the main look to the US and the West to supply them. Similarly, it is to the West that Indians look for the capital goods and equipment needed for their country's economic development. Further, despite the strong Indian conviction that they ought not to accept foreign economic assistance if any political "strings" are attached the Government of India has accepted technical and economic assistance from the US and publicly defended itself for doing so in the face of adverse criticism from the Parliamentary opposition.

Another economic factor favorable to the US is that India's trade is primarily with the West. Approximately 45 percent of India's total trade is with the US and UK and less than 3 percent with the Communist Bloc countries.

The activity of US business in India can also influence that country favorably toward the US -- as well as unfavorably. The success of Standard Vacuum Company in maintaining and staffing oil refineries near Bombay on a basis satisfactory to both them and to India has increased good will between Government of India and the American investor generally. Conversely, the inflexibility of General Motors before Government of India's insistence on arrangements allowing the gradual creation of an automotive industry engaged in the manufacture (and not merely the assembly) of parts resulted in mutual recrimination and less of faith.

SECRET

Factors



SECRET

-33-

Factors or conditions which tend to influence India unfavorably toward the US and the free world.

Foremost among the Indian factors which operate unfavorably to the interests of the US is the Indian policy of non-alignment in the cold war. Although Indian sympathies are more with the Western democracies than with the Communist Bloc countries the Government of India steadfastly and on principle refuses to align itself with the West or accept US leadership in world affairs. On the contrary it makes a point of pursuing an independent course of action determined by its conception of India's own national interest with the result that Indian foreign policy often clashes with that of the US. The Indian policy of non-alignment has a number of roots. First, there is the desire not to compromise India's newly won independence. Second, there is the desire to prevent, or at least to stay out of, a third world war as they believe that a period of peace is necessary for carrying out the economic development and social reforms required to consolidate India's position as an independent nation. Third, there is their relatively slight fear of Communist aggression and their grave concern regarding the possibility of a third world war. Fourth, there are their misgivings regarding US motives, their dislike of US cold war strategy and tactics, and Indian analysis of the present world situation which differs fundamentally from that which prevails in the US. Lastly, there is a certain amount of distaste for American culture and character which renders the idea of close ties with the US unattractive.

India is keenly sensitive to any infringement of its status as a free sovereign nation and shows deep concern regarding any outside interest in its protectorates, Sikkim and Bhutan, and its northern neighbor, Nepal, which although nominally independent is under strong Indian influence. Indian nationalism constitutes one of the bases of India's foreign policy of non-involvement and is an important contributory factor in India's refusal to accept foreign aid if political strings are attached. India is determined to eliminate all foreign ownership of Indian territory, and much of the nationalist drive which characterized its successful campaign to remove British rule has since independence been directed against the French and Portuguese to relinquish control of their tiny possessions in India. While France has transferred control of its Indian possessions to the Government of India, Portugal has indicated it intends to retain possession of its Indian pockets as long as possible. India's resentment of Portuguese intransigence in this matter tends to affect adversely its relations with Portugal's fellow members in NATO. Indian nationalism also manifests itself in the suspicious attitude toward US and other missionaries, particularly those resident in the border areas.

The American effort to unite the nations of the free world in common opposition to Communist aggression appears to Indians neither necessary nor desirable. They believe that Americans overestimate the Communist threat and misunderstand its real nature which in their view lies less in

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SECRET

SECRET

-34-

the danger of military aggression by Communist countries than in the possibilities for Communist subversive activities in countries made vulnerable to such activities by social, political and economic ills.

India's intense anti-colonialism tends in the main to influence India unfavorably to the US. Its influence is not, however, wholly negative. The fact that the US was also once a British colony that achieved its independence only with a struggle and the fact of American support for Indian independence constitutes a bond -- though not a very strong one -- between the two countries. Indians are aware of the excellence of the US record with regard to its own colonial possessions, especially the Philippines, but our past record is overshadowed by more recent events. US support for metropolitan powers and colonial regimes -- particularly the French in Indochina and North Africa -- has caused the Indians to comment unfavorably on the disparity between US professions of anti-colonialism and actual practice. While Indians generally recognize that this practice has been dictated not by the desire to support colonialism but because of what the US regarded as overriding considerations, they nevertheless feel that a policy that is constantly being overridden and which therefore seldom or never determines action has ceased to have much reality.

Closely related to Indian disapproval of American support for colonial regimes is Indian disapprobation of US support to regimes which the Indians regard as discredited, reactionary or not genuinely representative of, or responsible to, the people of their country as, for example, the governments of Chiang Kai Shek, Bao Dai, Castillo Armas, Franco, Rhee. The support of these regimes the Indians regard as not only morally indefensible but in the long run politically inexpedient. Indians hold that regimes which lack a strong democratic base and remain in power through outside support, no matter how anti-Communist they may be, are liable in the long run to be overthrown by Communist regimes who ride to power on the tide of popular discontent. Moreover, they hold that the US exerts on these governments, the Indians assert, amounts to a new form of colonialism. These regimes know that they are dependent on US support for their continued existence and that therefore they must in the last analysis comply with US wishes or perish.

A set of factors very unfavorable to the US are the various disputes between India and Pakistan of which the more important are the Kashmir issue and the canal waters dispute. The question of whether Kashmir would accede to Pakistan or India led to hostilities between the two countries which were terminated by a UN cease-fire in January 1949. Both India and Pakistan have since maintained armed forces in those parts of Kashmir which they hold, while attempts in the UN to arrange for Kashmir's demilitarization and the holding of a plebiscite have failed as have also bilateral discussions between the two countries. The canal waters dispute, which dates back to the partition of the province of Punjab in 1947, centers on Pakistan's claim to water supplies for certain of its canals from headworks which now lie in India. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has been in consultation with Indian and Pakistani representatives since 1952 in an attempt to work out

SECRET

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SECRET

-35-

a mutually acceptable plan for the utilization and development of these water resources. These two major controversies together with a variety of other lesser disputes have so embittered Indo-Pakistan relations as to make them a continuous problem to the US. They complicate and make more difficult our relations with both countries and divert the energies and resources of the countries into unproductive channels to the detriment of economic development and political stability. US efforts through the medium of the UN to obtain a settlement of the Kashmir dispute have not only been unsuccessful but have exposed the US to considerable Indian criticism, earlier on the ground that the US favored Pakistan in the dispute and more recently on the ground that Americans had been carrying on anti-Indian intrigue in Kashmir.

In view of the strained relations that exist between India and Pakistan, the Indian reaction to the American decision to extend military aid to Pakistan was strongly adverse. India felt, probably quite correctly, that Pakistan's chief interest in obtaining military aid was to strengthen its frontier vis-a-vis India and was perturbed at the prospect of any increase in the military strength of its potential enemy. It was also resented as a direct blow to India's aspiration for the creation of a "third area of peace" in Asia. In consequence of the US decision to extend military aid to Pakistan, Indo-Pakistan and US-Indian relations have deteriorated.

The extreme sensitivity of all Indians on matters of racial discrimination and color prejudice is a factor unfavorable to the US. Indians, in general, believe that racial discrimination in the US is much greater and more serious than it is and that Americans are much more influenced by color prejudice than they are. Thus, for example, Indians believe it significant that the A-bomb was not used against the "white" Germans but was employed against the Japanese and that the US has conducted its nuclear weapon tests in oriental waters. They are particularly sensitive about the treatment accorded Indian emigrants and their descendants in areas under white domination, e.g., South Africa, British East Africa, British West Indies, where Indians have been and still are subjected to humiliating disabilities. These include segregation of residence and public places, denial or restriction of franchise, and limitations upon ownership of property and rights of trading. Especially repugnant is the apartheid (race segregation) policy of the Union of South Africa. In former years Indians were greatly irritated by the discriminatory laws prohibiting Indians from immigrating into, and acquiring citizenship in, the US, but their adverse criticism of US immigration and naturalization policies had largely subsided since the exclusion laws were repealed in 1946.

The Hindu doctrine of ahimsa (non-violence) occupies a prominent place in India moralizing. Its acceptance tends to increase Indian susceptibility to Communist peace propaganda.

Indian horror of weapons of mass destruction is a factor that works against the US. Indians are aware that the USSR also has such weapons, but the greater publicity given US tests of nuclear weapons and the fact that

SECRET

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SECRET

-36-

these tests have been held in Asian waters rather than at home as in the case of the USSR have served to focus Indian disapprobation on the US whom they regard as more reckless and menacing with regard to such weapons than the Russians.

The Marxian interpretation of capitalist economics has an attraction for Indian intellectuals, and they are inclined to be more critical of US than of British capitalism. They tend to believe that prosperity is possible under the US system only as it keeps its industrial machine geared to war requirements, and that the system exploits not only its own workers but demands that US policies in Asia be exploitative.

SECRET

SECRET

-37-

Stage II

A-4-a. What identities and differences of interest do they see between themselves and the U.S.?

Discussed in part under A-4 above.

SECRET

SECRET

-38-

Stage II

A-4-b. What view do they have of U.S. leadership in the Free World?

There is ~~forthcoming~~ some growing recognition that the United States is making serious efforts for world peace and has no aggressive intentions, although India does not always agree with U.S. policy in specific cases. India opposed the U.S.-sponsored UN military move beyond the 38th parallel in Korea in 1950 as an act provocative to Communist China, but U.S. policy during the peace negotiations has convinced many Indians that the United States sincerely desired to end the war. During this same period Indian suspicion of the Soviet Union has tended to increase.

The most important cause of misunderstanding between India and the United States centers in Western policy in Asia, several features of which India strongly opposes. India continues to advocate the seating of the Peiping Government in the UN and the recognition of its sovereignty over Taiwan (Formosa) on the ground of its de facto control of China. India did not attend the San Francisco Conference on the Japanese Peace Treaty because of its view that no settlement in Asia can last unless it is acceptable to all Asian powers, including Communist China. India has also objected to the special position which the U.S. has maintained in Japan and the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands.

The other important source of friction results from India's belief that the United States fails to recognize the depth and importance of nationalist movements in colonial and backward areas. (55-29)

During 1954 Indian criticism of US leadership of the Free World with regard to Asia increased. The US-Pakistan military aid pact, Secretary Dulles' speech on "massive retaliation", the hydrogen bomb tests in the Pacific, and the conclusion of the Manila pact were interpreted by many Indians as evidence that the US was abdicating political leadership in favor of reliance on sheer military power. The Formosa crisis in 1955 has also raised Indian apprehension regarding US leadership. While most politically conscious Indians probably believe that the US sincerely desires to avoid war, they are fearful that some incident will occur which, in the extremely tense situation, will set off a major conflict.

SECRET

SECRET

-39-

A-4-c. How do they react to U.S. foreign policy generally?

See A-4-b above, this section.  
Also, A-4-e, below.

India is not likely to alter her foreign policy as a result of possible US moves. Even in the event of war, she will remain neutral so long as this is at all possible. Her attitude towards the US, however, will be adversely affected by any moves which India interprets as likely to lead to a spread of the conflict in Asia, or to a world war.

With regard to US economic aid, it is probable that, while the amount of good-will generated by economic aid is not great, withdrawal or substantial reduction of such aid would adversely affect Indian attitudes towards the US.

SECRET

SECRET

-40-

## Stage II

A-4-d. Do they admire or condemn particular aspects of U.S. culture as they see it? e.g., liberty, "materialism."

~~Most Indians are inclined to believe that the United States is completely materialistic in its outlook and is accordingly lacking in respect for achievement and cultural interests. (4-2-5)~~

### Suspicion and Envy of the Materialism and Mechanized Culture of the U.S.

Because of the limited contacts between India and the US during the period of British control, the literate public in the area is just beginning to replace its stereotypes of a materialist, largely uncultured, and machine-dominated country with some knowledge derived either from actual first-hand acquaintance with the US or from some reading of its history, ideas, and social institutions. Most Indian opinion of the US however, is still composed largely of stereotypes based on impressions gained (1) from the movies, (2) from British text-books and general British literature (which tended before World War II to concentrate either on classical Greece and Rome or on developments in Europe and its colonial empires, to the general neglect of the American hemisphere outside of Canada), and (3) from items with sufficient news value to be carried in the local press. The following are some of the more common stereotypes.

- (1) Society in the US revolves around sex, with a high divorce rate and little family life.
- (2) The US has virtually no culture of its own and depends on Europe for anything of value, while such developments as jazz, swing, be-bop, movies, and commercial advertising are evidence of the debasement of popular taste and the general lack of any indigenous intellectual or spiritual values.
- (3) The history of the US has been one of exploitation of vast natural resources with emphasis on the accumulation of wealth and on the production of mechanical gadgets for material comfort. This massing of wealth and tools has made the US one of the strongest countries in the modern world but has not produced any outstanding intellectual or moral leaders. The exercise of this power tends to be irresponsible and erratic and may thus be extremely dangerous.

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-41-

- (4) Closely allied with this view of US history is the notion that US society disregards or is ignorant of the importance of first principles and instead venerates wealth, material comfort and power as ends in themselves.
- (5) US politics are dominated by personal and party rivalries and are subject to sudden shifts in public opinions; consequently, major political decisions depend upon the mood of the moment and not on any systematic philosophy or the considered judgment of a particular leader or group of leaders.
- (6) Because of its wealth, the US scandalously wastes resources which other countries would husband carefully.
- (7) As a result of its power, its lack of any ancient cultural tradition, and its disregard for the cultural patterns of less successful nations, the US would like to impose the "American Way of Life" on the rest of the world.
- (8) Finally, it is widely believed by educated opinion in India that although Abraham Lincoln succeeded in freeing Negroes in the US from slavery he died a martyr and Negroes are still treated as second class citizens, generally segregated from social contact with whites and periodically subject to the dangers of lynching.

Many of these stereotypes are colored by the natural envy felt by weak and relatively poor countries for the obvious power and wealth of the US. In the main, however, these views are based on ignorance, on the limited opportunity for checking impressions through actual contact, and on the misunderstandings which almost inevitably arise between the products of widely differing types of culture. Thus, in addition to India's need for larger and more reliable amounts of information about the US, and the extension of opportunities for mutual contact, there is the particularly urgent need for the interpretation of US culture and objectives in terms which Indians can understand and appreciate.

SECRET

SECRET

-42-

A-4-e. What other factors contribute to the present state of Indo-U.S. Relations?

There is a definite ambivalence in attitudes toward the United States. Indians know that during their struggle for independence many of their countrymen found a political haven in the United States and that there was considerable sympathy for the Indian cause. Educated Indians also realize that the U.S. Government, on a number of occasions, showed interest in seeing the United Kingdom make concessions to the Indian nationalists, and that President Roosevelt personally pressed Prime Minister Winston Churchill on this subject. The warm welcome extended to Prime Minister Nehru during his American trip in 1949 made a profound impression in India. The shipment of wheat from the United States to India to reduce food shortages, the Point IV aid, and the Ford Foundation activities in India can also be expected to have a beneficial effect on the relations of the two countries.

On the negative side is the fact that to the ordinary Indian the American looks, speaks, and acts so much like an Englishman that he inherits the bias against the British built up over so many years. Furthermore, many Indians tend to be suspicious of U.S. intentions and to believe that the United States is taking over the role and international policies formerly associated with the United Kingdom. Part of that role was the policing of Far Eastern waters and the regulation of Asian trade.

The Indians do not expect that the United States will attempt any direct colonization but suspect an indirect policy of economic penetration and control. Prime Minister Nehru has voiced his concern over "controlism" before the Indian Parliament. The fear of growing U.S. intervention in Asia is back of India's alarm over the retention of U.S. bases and U.S. military expansion in the Pacific. This accounts for much of the unfavorable Indian reaction to a Japanese peace treaty leaving American forces stationed in and around Japan indefinitely, and its desire for a settlement in Korea stipulating a total withdrawal of all foreign troops.

Other sources of dissatisfaction with American foreign policy include the belief that the United States is complacent about colonialism in the Far East because of the U.S. desire for allies in Europe to counter the U.S.S.R. Indians have criticized the US for its failure to commit itself in the Indian-Portuguese dispute over Goa and other Portuguese enclaves in India. According to Indian critics, the US failure to bring pressure to bear on Portugal is due to Portuguese membership in NATO and the consequent US reluctance to offend it, despite the merits of the Goa case.

The difference between US economic and military aid to Europe and that made available to Asia is also resented. Indians were chagrined because

European

SECRET

SECRET

-43-

European countries receive enormous sums as direct gifts, while the cost of the wheat sent to India to avoid famine had to be arranged on a loan basis, and then only after lengthy debate by the U.S. Congress.

Indians feel that the former immigration bars raised against them by the United States were largely based on race and color, and they believe that they are now allowed what is nothing more than a token immigration quota to the United States. They are sensitive, therefore, to race issues and tales of injustice and arbitrary treatment based on race. They hear and read about the race problem in America; Indian papers feature any episode involving race friction in the United States. Many Indians therefore have the idea that all Negroes are grossly mistreated everywhere in the United States. Few have a clear picture of the regional nature of the worst discriminatory practices or of the amount of progress in race relations which has occurred in recent years.

The notion that the United States is an extraordinarily wealthy, efficient, and technologically advanced country, free from economic and social problems like those prevailing in India, makes for belief that the United States is not the country to which India must look for clues to the solution of her difficulties. It is not realized that many of India's current problems of sanitation, urbanization, industrialization, and the like are precisely the issues that the United States faced in times past. At the same time most Indians are inclined to believe that the United States is completely materialistic in its outlook and is accordingly lacking in artistic achievement and cultural interests. There is virtually no knowledge of the degree to which art, music, drama, and literature flourish and enter into the lives of a substantial sector of the American population. Nor is there much appreciation of the fact that the U.S. drive to raise the standard of living allows for a much wider pursuit of artistic and intellectual interests by the general population. (42-22 and 23)

In the field of foreign policy, the Congress advocates the maintenance of friendly relations with all countries, continued membership in the Commonwealth, and an independent policy which avoids alignment with any "power bloc." However, increasing suspicion of the U.S.S.R. and China, the definite communist threat at home, and the need for capital, which the United States can furnish, has disposed a number of party leaders to favor closer ties but not direct alignment with the United States. (53-17)

The Kashmir dispute with Pakistan is also a factor in Indo-US relations. US military aid to Pakistan has raised many new questions in India regarding US neutrality in the dispute. The announcement of the US-Pakistan military assistance pact led Prime Minister Nehru to demand the withdrawal of US

SECRET

members

SECRET

-44-

members of the UN observers team in Kashmir on the grounds that they could no longer be considered neutral. Furthermore, Indian leaders have stated that the US-Pakistan agreement has "altered the context" of the Kashmir dispute and have indicated that India's position might be "reconsidered."

SECRET

SECRET

-45-

Stage II

- A-5. What other attitudes condition their views of East-West tension?

*See below*

~~All important attitudes are discussed below.~~

SECRET

SECRET

-46-

Stage II

- A-5-a. Do differences and disputes with other nations of the area affect the Indian attitude toward the U.S. and the West? (e.g., the Kashmir and canal water disputes with Pakistan.)

Relations between India and Pakistan are under present circumstances likely to continue much as at present for an indefinite period. No solution of the Kashmir dispute satisfactory to both countries is likely to emerge and the present de facto partition of Kashmir is likely to continue. India is not likely to resort to arms against Pakistan, nor under present circumstances is Pakistan likely deliberately to go to war with India. There is, however, always the possibility that irresponsible elements may touch off hostilities. A solution of the canal waters dispute may, perhaps, be reached in time, although present prospects do not appear particularly bright. Some of the other outstanding problems between the two countries may eventually be settled but it is unlikely that all of them will be. Indian opposition to US military aid to Pakistan has outdone in violence, intensity and duration any previous criticism in India of the US on a specific issue. The US has been accused of partiality in favor of Pakistan in the Kashmir dispute, and India asked that US observers be withdrawn from the UN teams in the disputed territory. Increased suspicion of US motives and actions also led to charges of US intervention and spying in Nepal, which is virtually an Indian protectorate. There has also been some criticism in India of the Turkish-Pakistan pact and other proposed Middle Eastern pacts which are believed to be Western-oriented, on the grounds that they are sponsored by the US and do not contribute to any relaxation of world tension. The fact that Indian aspirations for leadership of an unaligned Arab-Asian bloc may be frustrated by such pacts also contributes to Indian resentment.

The formation of the Manila pact was also deeply resented in India. Many Indians feared this development would unnecessarily inject cold war problems into the area and increase tensions. Furthermore, the inclusion of Pakistan and other Asian countries in what is viewed as a US-sponsored pact, runs counter to Nehru's concept of an Asian "no-war" area, presumably under Indian leadership.

The tension between the US and Communist China over Formosa and the off-shore islands also affects Indian attitudes toward the US. India's overriding concern in this situation is the fear that tension between the US and Communist China in the area may lead to an open conflict resulting in a third world war. While accepting the Communist claim to Formosa as justified, India also appears to recognize -- without strongly disapproving -- that the US intends to protect Formosa. Within this framework, the Indians tend to view with approval any policy, whether advanced by the US or Communist

SECRET

China

SECRET

-47-

China, which they believe to be conciliatory or helpful in securing a cease-fire or a peaceful settlement. The US stand on protecting the off-shore islands is not considered a policy contributing to the lessening of tensions and thus the Indian press has not hesitated to severely criticize the US for it. In general, unless the Chinese Communists engage in unprovoked aggression, US actions will probably receive more criticism than those of Peiping, since most Indians feel that Communist China is legally entitled to both Formosa and to off-shore islands.

US policy in Indochina and Korea also affects Indian attitudes toward the East-West conflict. As with regard to Formosa, India is primarily concerned with reducing tension and minimizing the chance of open conflict in these areas. Thus US actions which are interpreted as provocative or inflexible tend to be severely criticized in India, while indications that the US is concerned with finding peaceful solutions to these problems are viewed with approval. The US failure to associate itself with the Geneva Agreement on Indochina evoked strong criticism in India, and many Indians considered the extension of Manila pact guarantees to include South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to be in contravention of the Geneva accords.

SECRET

SECRET  
-48-

Stage II

A-5-b. What influence do ideological, moral or religious concepts have on the Indian attitude toward the East-West conflict?

India's religio-philosophical ideas and tradition, particularly those of Hinduism, play an important role in shaping attitudes toward the West. Educated Indians tend to assume that the peoples of the West, particularly those of the United States, have a materialistic, mechanized and largely irreligious culture which has resulted in the development of aggressive but insecure personalities, the destruction of family and social ties, and the aggravation of international rivalry to the point where world security itself is threatened. By contrast it is felt that India through intensive meditation and philosophic speculation has achieved certain profound religious insights which the world badly needs but which the materialistic mind of the West either does not or cannot grasp. Furthermore, because the spread of Christianity in India during the past two centuries has been linked in the popular mind with British imperialist rule, Western professions of Christian principles are often viewed with cynicism or distrust. (43-4)

The pacifism of India encourages a sense of moral responsibility for peace.

The Indian judicial system includes a tradition of mediation. The idea is to determine not what is right and what is wrong, but to find out what is right in the positions of each side and to work out a solution acceptable to both sides.

Indians would support our ideas of freedom, and dignity of the individual, but in viewing the moral case as between East and West, they would see the West as having exploited other groups and perhaps unconsciously having impulses to continue economic and other interests at the expense of other groups. Also, there is the feeling that the US is inclined to be belligerent. While they condemn government control and the pressure and force associated with Communism, they view its objectives and improvements in living standards under Communism as morally good. They see elements of good and bad in both sides. They view capitalism as tending to be exploitative unless controlled by government.

India is in fact imbued with a missionary zeal in the cause of pacifism which has its roots deep in history. "We should make all attempts at a peaceful solution so as to give the world no cause to accuse us of not having done everything possible to avert war. We must omit nothing, no matter how slender our hopes of success." The words might be Mr. Nehru's. In reality they come from the Lord Krishna in the Mahabharata, India's great religious epic which is as basic to Hindu thought as the Bible is for the West.

SECRET



SECRET  
-49-

Stage II

- B. What factors contribute to shape, strengthen, or weaken these attitudes?

SECRET

-50-

Stage II

B-1. What is the content of the nationalist idea and sentiment in India?

Despite the diversity of racial stock, religious and linguistic differences, great variety of customs, Indian civilization has in Hinduism a fundamental unity in widely shared religious beliefs and social institutions. ~~(1947)~~ This common cultural unity forms the essential basis for the modern nationalist movements and nationalism. The threat of Western influences and of external aggression only seems to heighten the consciousness of common culture heritage and give content and emotional drive to the modern political nationalism which has seized the nation.

Attitudes and reactions of the people

Nationalistic attitudes

India gained her independence in 1947 after a century of struggle against British rule. The first nationalist stirrings were limited largely to a demand that Indians be given more consideration for official positions and some voice in the control of their own affairs. At first, the move for greater recognition of Indian talent and more self-government was generally limited to Bengal, where the first Europeanized Indian intelligentsia arose. But it was not long before these ideas spread to all corners of the land and became a mass movement. The fact that the independence movement was directed against domination by a foreign people markedly different in appearance, language, and customs, welded Indians together, despite internal political distinctions and differences. Leaders, slogans, and organized groups arose on a national basis. Gandhi, himself a Vaisya, could not be said to have represented any one caste or class. Scores of millions of people participated in the noncooperation and Swadeshi (boycott of foreign goods) protests against British rule.

In order to justify the independence struggle and to gain and hold their mass following, the leaders of the nationalist movement had necessarily to point to the past glories of India, to her alleged sufferings and repression under foreign rule, and to her potentialities if she could but gain her freedom. Slogans, songs, poems, insignia, and even articles of apparel such as the Gandhi cap became symbols which knit the people together in the nationalist cause.

During this period British spokesmen asserted that they were giving the Indians as much self-rule as they were ready for, and that the United Kingdom had an obligation to remain in India to protect the progress toward modernization that had been made and to guard the interests of the minorities

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SECRET-51-

who would suffer if the Europeans left India before popular institutions were firmly rooted. This led to heated and eloquent affirmations by Indian leaders everywhere that Indians were able to govern their own affairs and that the nation would hold together and prosper without British guidance. Thus, a fierce and uncompromising nationalism grew up in an effort to secure independence, and the Congress Party, which led the movement, elaborated social and economic reform policies to refute any charge that the country would not benefit by independence. Millions of Indians became dedicated to the liberation of their country; countless thousands gave up education and personal prospects for advancement to join the political movement; thousands more risked physical injury and jail to agitate for independence. By the time the goal was achieved a broad segment of the political leadership of the country was associated in the popular mind with social and economic reforms and ideals of self-sacrifice.

Since the British withdrawal and the transfer of power to the Congress Party, popular attitudes toward its political leadership have changed considerably. The Congress Party still commands a measure of popular good will principally because of its long association with Mohandas Gandhi, its role in gaining independence, and its sponsorship of a land reform program. Nevertheless the fact that the independent government has been unable to make any substantial improvement either in rural or urban welfare has resulted in a growing apathy toward the central government in rural areas and in considerable disappointment and cynicism in urban areas, particularly among impatient reformist elements. The Congress Party, however, is still by far the best organized and the best-known political body. Its leader, Jawaharlal Nehru, is a national hero with a substantial following throughout the country.

With the achievement of the primary nationalist goal, the throwing off of the foreign yoke, provincialism and separatist tendencies have come to the fore. Nationalism and patriotism are still important influences and valiant attempts are being made to further integrate the country. But the vast distances, the relatively poor transportation and communication systems, and a highly stratified society living in small villages encourage localism and division. When questions pertaining to a national language or to administrative units arise there is a strong interest in seeing that local aspirations are considered. Any decision made for the national good is bound to run counter to some local demands. Consequently, there are both centrifugal and centripetal forces in India today; one of the real problems facing the central government is how to achieve needed unity without outraging this or that region or section of the population. A planning commission of the central government has issued a report outlining a five-year plan for economic and social improvement on a national scale. Yet at almost the same time Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, the most prominent leader of the untouchables, left the cabinet with the charge that Muslims in India are shown more consideration than the Scheduled Castes.

SECRET

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SECRET

-52-

Still, in spite of all divisions, a definite national consciousness is in evidence. The symbols of independent India are an expression of this national feeling and its deep roots. The national flag is a horizontal tricolor with bands of deep saffron, white and dark green. In the center of the white band is a dark blue wheel, the wheel of the law (dharma chakra) of King Asoka, as it appears on the abacus of the Sarnath lion capital. In India the colors convey rich symbolism, the saffron standing for courage and sacrifice, the white for peace and truth, and the green for faith and chivalry. The wheel symbolizes justice and fellowship.

The Indian National anthem, Jana Gana Mana, composed by the great poet, Rabindranath Tagore, is most appropriate for the purpose of promoting unity, for it was written largely with this aim in mind, as the opening lines illustrate:

Thou art the ruler of the minds of all people,  
Thou Dispenser of India's destiny,  
Thy name rouses the hearts of the Punjab, Sind,  
Gujarat and Maratha, of Dravid, Orissa and Bengal,  
It echoes in the hills of the Vindhya and Himalayas,  
Mingles in the music of Jumna and Ganges,  
And is chanted by the waves of the Indian Sea.

With independence and the emergence of heroes and martyrs of the liberation movement, a new set of holidays has come into force. August 15, the date of transfer of power from the United Kingdom to India, is celebrated as Independence Day. January 26, the date the constitution became effective, is celebrated both in India and by India's missions abroad as Republic Day. The anniversaries of the birth and death of Mohandas Gandhi have also become important occasions.

Since modern, independent India is so young a country and as the groups which will guide her destiny are still in the process of formation, there has been little expression of popular aspirations concerning the future of the country, as distinct from party policies. Newspaper opinion reflects party points of view. Followers of Pandit Nehru want a secular state in which Muslims will feel as unhampered religiously as Hindus; sweeping agricultural reforms; much more extensive industrialization; state ownership and control of most industries relating to transportation, communication, and defense; a settlement on honorable terms with Pakistan; the termination of all Western colonialism in Asia; and the avoidance of any involvements with any major power or power bloc which might lead to war in the near future. Followers of Gandhi support most of these same aspirations but differ in that they would emphasize large-scale industry less and cottage industries and agriculture more. Followers of right-wing Congress Party leaders, such as P. Tandon, former President of the party, want less dependence on the West, a greater reliance on old Indian patterns of thought and action, a much firmer stand against

SECRET

Pakistan

SECRET

-53-

Pakistan, and special concessions to Sikh and Hindu refugees from Pakistan. Supporters of right-wing organizations, such as the Hindu Mahasabha would like to see Pakistan reunited to India, by force if necessary. Socialist sympathizers and politically conscious peasant and labor groups want the prompt redistribution of land, grants of land to the landless, and socialization of most industry. Communist supporters, who are still only about 5% of the population, want a total rearrangement of social and economic life under a communist dictatorship and a foreign policy closely following that of the Soviet Union and China. Most Indians would like to see the country become self-sufficient in food and grow strong enough to follow an independent policy in international affairs and to exert an influence commensurate with the size of its population. (42-21)

The establishment of a government responsible to the people and the extension of political rights to all Indians have given opportunity for the political expression of a number of tensions, divisions, and conflicts which were formerly minimized by the primary objective of independence. Although the prospect as of April 1952 was that the cohesive forces of nationalism would remain dominant, numerous divisive tendencies had become manifest -- many with considerable force. On the other hand the common fight for independence has itself made an important contribution to the sense of national community in India. This is reinforced by the common stakes in the present extensive structure of government, the common system of education and the common fund of ideas of the middle and upper classes who will continue to be the main source of political leadership for some time to come, and the all-pervasive Hindu social system which is still the most important cohesive force at the village level. (53,54)

Whereas religion profoundly influences life throughout the country, education, press, and radio reach only a small minority, principally in urban areas. Education is still largely the privilege of the few with only about 15% of the population in 1951 estimated to be literate. The proportion of government expenditures on education to total expenditures compares favorably with modern states in the West. Because of the poverty of the general population and the limited resources, however, actual expenditure per pupil amounts only to a fraction of that spent in the West. In the past the educational system has been geared primarily to preparing students for a Western type of classical education and government service. India is currently engaged in revising and reorganizing this system with three major objectives: 1) the provision of a practical education on a universally compulsory basis for all children between the age of 6 and 14; 2) an emphasis on scientific and technical subjects .....; and 3) a gradual replacement of English with Hindi, the new national language, as a medium of instruction .....

All media of public information and opinion in the country are geared primarily to serve the .....60 million inhabitants of urban areas where most literacy is centered .....English is still the most widely used medium.....The guarantees of freedom of the press and speech in the

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constitution

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-54-

constitution of India are broadly drawn." While there is an opposition press which functions relatively freely, papers can be suppressed in the interests of national security. The government exercises a monopoly on radio. (43-2)

SECRET

SECRET

-55-

Stage II

B-1-a. How strong is the Indian sense of national unity? What factors tend to promote or hinder the growth of Indian national consciousness?

The almost continental size of India, the diversity of the racial stocks, the religious and linguistic differences dividing the people, and the great variety of customs have led to the common belief that the country lacks a community of culture and interests. On the contrary, however, Indian civilization from very early times has been characterized by a fundamental unity based upon common sympathies derived from widely shared religious beliefs and social institutions.

Only a small section of the population remains outside the pervading influence of Hinduism which by 300 B.C. became firmly established as an integrated religious, social, and economic system, and spread throughout the sub-continent.

Islamic invasions of the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries have modified some aspects of the cultural and social scene, without, however, altering its essentials.

Modern technological, ideological and political institutions have begun to show signs of penetrating more deeply into Indian society, to affect the basic social structure and the prevailing view of life. For the first time since the earliest days India's basic cultural structure is being undermined; change is increasingly involving the more fundamental aspects of the civilization. (40A-1)

Factionalism along religious and caste lines continues to work within the new nationalism. As regards the outside world, however, Indians tend to be highly and emotionally sensitive to real or presumed slights of their country, and there is a corresponding idealization of the Indian past and of all things India in the present. Western ways are simultaneously embraced and condemned for their destructive effect upon the indigenous civilization. This cultural schizophrenia is psychologically distressing to those caught in it, but its existence suggests that Indian civilization will not become a carbon copy of that of the West, but will represent rather a new synthesis of traditional Indian and characteristically Western patterns. (40-6)

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-56-

In India, as in all of South Asia, internal conflicts created by the evolution of new social patterns are a serious disuniting factor. These conflicts were created by the impact of Western ideas, religious beliefs, moral values, and productivity upon the folkways and mores of a society in which the masses are plodding, illiterate, sub-marginal farmers. All classes have been shaped by a way of life which stratified society according to caste and legalized oppression of the lowest. Western values acquired a special meaning because they were supported by strong military force and by advanced technologies and sciences. Western experience also infused a new element into the historic Hindu-Moslem conflict which had torn the sub-continent for centuries -- that of nationalism. Many Indians have accepted Western values and discarded those of their fathers. Others have attempted to select desirable elements from both. Some have reverted fanatically to their traditional beliefs. Great numbers have relinquished their old beliefs and rejected the Western ones, and drift aimlessly ~~or aimlessly~~, or fall prey to, the false leadership of the Communists. The old ways of life are giving way, or being modified; the strictures of caste and custom are being broken; and the resulting conflict is a serious source of weakness to India.

Nevertheless, there were a number of important divisive factors. Some of them have their roots deep in India history or in the social structure while others are of more recent origin. Several minor parties which support particular communal, local or regional interests have been formed and have in some special instances successfully challenged the national parties. Regional and local interests, strongly reinforced by language differences, motivate the demands for autonomy or regional re-organization by the Gurkha League in the eastern Himalayas and north Bengal, by the numerous tribal parties in Assam and Bihar, and by such major regional groups as the Punjabis and Bengalis in the north, the Gujaratis and Marathas in the west, and the Telugus and Malayalis of Andhra and Kerala in the south. Both rightist and communist elements have had considerable success in exploiting regional sentiment: the former in the Punjab and Rajasthan, the latter in Andhra and Kerala. Religious differences have been another divisive factor. Although the suspicion and distrust aroused between Hindus and Muslims during the fight for partition is subsiding and a number of Muslims, including several Muslim Leaguers, participated in the 1951-52 elections, it will take time and continued official effort to assure whole-hearted political cooperation in many areas. In addition to Hindu-Muslim tension, considerable tension has developed between Sikhs and Hindus in northwest India, as Sikhs have tended to blame the Hindus for acquiescing in the partition of the Punjab and for the fact that the central government has been unable to compensate the Sikh refugees for all they have lost in Pakistan. There has also been considerable rivalry over political jobs and influence between the sizable Christian population and the Hindus in the United State of Travancore-Cochin in south India. (53-4)

SECRET

Nationalist



SECRET

-57-

Nationalist sentiments, which are of recent growth in India, have succeeded to a certain extent in weakening centrifugal forces and overriding sectional loyalties. Important elements in these sentiments are pride in India's past, attachment to the motherland as a territorial entity, and a growing national self-respect. Their strength is seen in the reaction of all Indians regardless of caste, religion, locality or language to the racial discrimination against Indian nationals as practiced in South Africa.

Nationalism also evinces itself in a concern for India's dignity and prestige, in the desire for a place in the international sphere commensurate with India's size and ancient position as a fountainhead of Asian culture, and in the belief that India has a contribution to make in solving the world's problems. Nationalism may thus prove to be a stimulus to India's efforts to advance towards the social and economic goals set up during the struggle for independence and emphasized by the present government.

At the present time, however, it is doubtful that nationalism has taken strong enough root in the population as a whole to make an important contribution towards a stable socio-political system.

~~(Note: The extent to which the pressure for redistribution of Indian states on a linguistic basis constitutes a divisive influence is being examined in a study by the NSC staff, dated 12/1/53.)~~

SECRET

SECRET

-58-

Stage II

B-1-b. Have Indians a pride in their nation, its history and achievements? To which features of these do they point with pride?

Like other peoples the Indians have a deep pride in their own cultural and religious traditions. They point with especial pride to the beauties of their art and architecture, their forms of dance and music, the broad toleration and the philosophic profundities of Hinduism and the ancient origin of these attributes of their life antedating most of Western civilization and that of the rest of Far Eastern Asia to which they contributed so much including Buddhism itself, the religion of millions of Chinese, Japanese and the majority of the peoples of Southeast Asia. It is this consciousness which causes the leaders of India to feel that they have an inherent right to a role of leadership in Far Eastern Asia, and more particularly in Southern Asia.

Most of the arts existing in India today have a long tradition and much pride and sentiment attached to them. Architecture, sculpture, and even casting in bronze were highly developed in the Indus valley cultures of 5,000 years ago. One of the bronze figures of this early period is that of a dancing girl, suggesting that the dance, too, is one of the country's most ancient arts. Students of art are familiar with the stately pillars with their carved capitals and noble inscriptions erected by King Asoka at various places in the country well before the Christian era. At least eight of these pillars remain in good condition today. To this same early period belong outstanding carvings of both real life and inanimate subjects. To the first and second centuries before Christ also belong the great Buddhist shrines of Bharhut, Sanchi, and Bodh Gaya, with the rounded mounds (stupas) for the relics of the Buddha and the carvings in relief on the railings depicting the story of his life.

The cave shrines and monasteries of Ajanta and Ellora with their frescoes and figured sculptures date from the fifth and sixth centuries after Christ. Through the years a number of styles of temple construction developed. In modern temple construction, such as that of the Birla Temple in Delhi, there is an attempt to reconcile and utilize the features of a number of these forms.

SECRET

Artists

SECRET

-59-

Artists everywhere pay tribute to South Indian bronzes, which have been skillfully made from the tenth century to the present day. Some of the representations in bronze of the god Shiva as Nataraja (the lord of the dance) are considered especially noteworthy for grace, power, and symbolic portrayal.

Indian literature goes back to 1500 B.C. when some of the hymns of the sacred Vedas must have been composed. From that point there is a chain of important literary expression. The great Indian epics, the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, which were probably compiled and reworked for hundreds of years before they reached their present form, have provided the aspiration for much of the painting, drawing, writing, and sculpturing down to the present day.

One of the first great Indian authors about whom we know something definite is Kalidasa, who lived in the fourth and fifth centuries after Christ. His poem Cloud Messenger and his play Shakuntala are still widely read today. Another important figure in India's literary history is the Hindu poet, Tulsī Das (1532-1623). His version of the Ramayana has been both a literary and a religious force in northern India.

In addition to historical and legendary episodes, a favorite theme for nationalistic novelists and poets during the long struggle for independence was attacks on Western imperialism and criticism of British-imposed Western ideas and mores. Socialist and communist attacks on Western imperialism attracted a number of able and well-known writers, such as Mulk Raj Anand, Bankim Mukerji, and Harindranath Chattopadhyaya. These writers, although now closely associated with the Indian Communist Party's propaganda activities, have achieved a reputation both for their writing ability and for the nationalistic tone of their work, and continue to exert considerable influence.

In India the dance is a highly developed art form with a long tradition and an involved technique. An intricate language of hand gesture (mudra) has grown up which is so precise and detailed that anyone who knows the key can follow the episodes and story accurately. The nationalist movement encouraged intellectuals to take an active interest in the dance as an important part of the nation's cultural heritage. Several schools were started, the best known being those of Rukmini Devi and one of her pupils, Uday Shankar. These schools concentrate on traditional dance forms, but are also developing new dances for traditional themes as well as new themes.

SECRET

Indian

SECRET

-60-

Indian classical music is highly developed technically. India's tradition of painting is almost as old as its other arts. The paintings in the rock-cut temples of Ajanta and Ellora and the fresco paintings of Bagh in Gwalior were on a grand scale and have been acclaimed by experts as unsurpassed up to the time of the greatest of the Italian masters. Indian artists showed a talent for miniatures as well, as shown in the illuminated manuscripts of the Pala school of Bengal (ninth to twelfth centuries after Christ) and the Gujarati school (eleventh to fifteenth centuries after Christ).

Indians are proud of their successful struggle for independence and of their achievements since 1947 in attaining national unity, in formulating a democratic constitution and in carrying out their economic development programs.

Indians also take pride in their country's increasing prominence in world affairs and believe that India, under Nehru's guidance, can continue to make, a significant contribution to world peace. Indians tend, however, to be very sensitive to any indications that India's position of nonalignment and what they conceive to be its role in bridging the gulf between East and West is misunderstood or not appreciated by either side.

Indians were proud of the role they were called upon to play in Korea and believe that the Indian representatives on the Repatriation Commission brought credit to India. Most Indians also felt that, while India was not officially a participating member of the Geneva Conference, it played a significant and commendable role in representing "independent Asian views" to the conferees and in bringing about a cease-fire in Indochina. The selection of India as chairman of the supervisory commission in Indochina has been a source of pride to many Indians, who feel that it is another indication of the usefulness of India's position in the cold war and of the confidence both sides have in India's impartiality.

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SECRET

-61-

Stage II

B-1-c. How do Indians look upon themselves and their culture in comparison with the people and culture of other countries?

Indians take great pride in their ancient culture (as shown elsewhere in this paper). At the same time they are aware that they have been left behind in the technical field, are anxious to catch up, and are afraid they may not. They consider their religion as superior and all-embracing.

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SECRET  
-62-

Stage II

B-1-d. How do Indians regard other countries and their nationals, especially the USSR and China, Europe and the U.S.?

Policy toward the Soviet Union

India's relations with the Soviet Union have been formally correct, but with little evidence of positive friendliness. These relations reflect the government's keen awareness of India's vulnerability to Soviet attack and the desire to demonstrate the genuineness of India's policy of nonalignment with either the eastern or western power blocs. The Indian Government has generally refrained from criticizing the Soviet Government and has endeavored to remove or prevent frictions between the two countries. These efforts to minimize criticism of the U.S.S.R. are sometimes interpreted by non-Indians as favoring the U.S.S.R. particularly when viewed in conjunction with the strong Indian criticism of the United States on some issues. India, however, has shown no interest in developing close relations with the Soviet Union. The contrast between India's attitude toward the Soviet Union and its attitude toward the United States appears to stem from four major considerations. First there is India's profound fear of provoking its more immediate neighbor. Second is the apparent feeling that because of the retention of the Commonwealth tie and of Western-inspired political institutions, India must take special measures to convince Asia and the Near East as well as the Soviet Union of its own complete independence and its policy of nonalignment. Third is India's belief that the only hope of surviving as an effective mediator between the two power blocs is to maintain a meticulously correct attitude of diplomatic courtesy towards the rigidly controlled government of the Soviet Union; whereas relations with the United States, another democratic nation, may be put on a free give-and-take basis, including frank exchanges of criticism and conflicting ideas. Finally, there is the Indian conviction that the wartime losses of the Soviet Union left that country with a determination to delay involvement in a third world war so that it might devote itself to consolidating its position in eastern Europe and to strengthening its outer defenses. By contrast it is felt that the wartime successes of the United States and U.S. superiority in atomic weapons might tempt it to precipitate a general conflagration either through some hasty action or as the result of a deliberate policy of a preventive war.

The USSR's rebuff of India's conciliatory efforts in mid-1950 has dampened India's more optimistic expectations of helping achieve an early

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-63-

negotiated settlement between the two power blocs. Nevertheless, India continues to believe that neither power bloc can eliminate the other and that India eventually might have the opportunity of contributing to world peace by bringing the two blocs together in negotiating a mutually acceptable agreement. Many Indian leaders are growing increasingly suspicious of Soviet objectives while beginning to develop a better understanding of U.S. policies and points of view. Nevertheless, there is still widespread Indian belief that the U.S.S.R. has serious reasons for wanting to avoid a world war and there is considerable Indian fear that U.S. public opinion is sufficiently unpredictable that some unforeseen incident might suddenly convert the cold war into a hot one. First the Indian press and then even government officials have become more openly critical of Soviet tactics and achievements since the first three years of independence. However, the four basic considerations which determine India's policy of nonalignment, though somewhat modified in the light of experience have not substantially altered.

Apart from political and strategic considerations there was at the time of independence a great deal of Indian curiosity about Soviet economic achievements. The speed with which the Soviet Union industrialized a backward and predominantly agricultural economy to convert itself into a dominant world power in less than thirty years had aroused considerable interest and respect among educated circles in India. It was felt that the problems confronting India of a peasant and illiterate population living under a strongly traditionalistic social system were very similar to those tackled by the Soviet Union at the end of World War I. Prior to independence Indian curiosity in Soviet achievements had acquired a strong nationalist tinge as a result of the restrictions placed by the British Government of India on Indian contacts with the U.S.S.R. In Indian eyes a visit to the Soviet Union tended to take on the aspect of a patriotic gesture of defiance of British authority. Many educated Indians resented what they considered to be officious British efforts to control what Indians should see or think, adopting the view that the people of every nation have the right to make their own investigation of any problem that is of concern to them and to come to their own decisions. To Indian curiosity in the Soviet experiment was added considerable interest among socialist circles for some of the philosophy of communism, and since British restrictions made first-hand observations difficult, a marked tendency to note only the positive achievements of the U.S.S.R. and to give the Soviets the benefit of every doubt.

Since independence, however, many of India's glowing expectations over what was to be learned from the Soviet experiment have been giving way to growing disillusionment. A number of Indian leaders are becoming increasingly aware of the aggressive and expansionist nature of Soviet aims. Prime Minister Nehru has confidentially indicated that he has grave apprehensions

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-6a-

concerning Soviet intentions. Distrust of Soviet intentions has also been growing among educated Indians as the propagandistic nature of the Soviet "Peace" campaign and the "behind-the-scenes" role of the U.S.S.R. have become more obvious. Some visiting Indians have been taken in by the ostentatious treatment accorded them in the U.S.S.R. but a few of the more discerning have noticed Soviet limitations on efforts to make first-hand observations, or to get information on Soviet discoveries and techniques. Indian leaders are still trying to gather information on Soviet achievements and experience that might be of use to India. However, they repeatedly note the great human cost of the Soviet gains, clearly indicating that India does not consider such methods acceptable. Indian leaders, having decided in favor of institutions of representative and responsible government, are openly critical of the authoritarian nature of the Soviet system.

During 1954 the USSR and satellites increased their efforts to expand their trade with India. The Soviet Union also made several dramatic offers of technical and economic assistance to India, thus challenging for the first time Western preeminence in this field and attempting to exploit the propaganda potential inherent in such programs. The most noteworthy development was the signing of an agreement between India and the USSR in February 1955, providing for extensive USSR credit and technical aid in the construction of a 1,000,000 ton steel mill in central India. If construction to modern standards proceeds with reasonable dispatch, this project will impress many Indians as tangible evidence of Soviet willingness and ability to promote their development goals. Indian officials, on the other hand, are aware of Soviet motives. In accepting technical assistance, the Indian government will doubtless take measures to limit political activities on the part of Soviet personnel and to prevent the use of rupees obtained by the USSR for subversive activities in India.

The increased suspicion of the U.S.S.R. has been aggravated by the emergence in the 1951-52 elections of the Communist Party as a relatively small but well-organized and potentially significant force in Indian politics. The Indian Government is becoming increasingly aware of the international character of the party and its threat of subversion. In contrast to the formally correct attitude of the Government of India toward the Soviet Union, is the determination with which it has put down all attempts at subversion and public disruption by the Communist Party of India.

Although growing suspicion of the U.S.S.R. has begun to make an important change in Indian attitudes toward the U.S.S.R. since independence any major formal shift in Indian policy toward the U.S.S.R. in the near future is unlikely.

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-65-

Both Indian Government leaders and most politically conscious elements among the Indian public apparently believe that the U.S.S.R. is not prepared to risk a world war and is relying instead on extending its power and ideology by working through local Communist parties. The fact that the Soviet Union has not attempted the direct military conquest of any of the weak countries on its southern border and has refrained from sending Soviet troops into Korea appears to have encouraged this belief. The Indian Government takes the view that if the noncommunist world could refrain from all acts of provocation, generally suppress comment hostile to the Soviet bloc, and concentrate its efforts on localizing and settling all points of conflict between the communist and noncommunist world in peripheral areas, a third world war could be prevented. At the same time the government believes that each nation should take firm measures against internal communist groups and that all free nations should work together to alleviate conditions of poverty, and political unrest which foster the growth of communism.

#### Policy toward China

Since the consolidation of the Communist regime in China, India's conciliatory policy toward the Peiping regime has been motivated by several factors: (1) India's overall desire to maintain good relations with all countries, while remaining aloof from the cold war conflict; (2) a desire to reduce world tensions by acting as a mediator between Communist China and the West; (3) the hope of facilitating a weakening of the ties between China and the USSR; (4) the need to avoid antagonizing Communist China, a superior military power; and (5) the hope that friendly and conciliatory treatment will beget a like response. Despite its policy of friendship, however, India has been increasingly sensitive to, and apprehensive of, the growing danger of Communist infiltration across its northern border, and the potential challenge posed by Communist China to India's aspirations of leadership in southern Asia. As a result, the Nehru government has made efforts to develop India's economy and to strengthen the country's northern border defenses. In addition, probably with an eye to recent events in Southeast Asia, India has pursued a policy described by one of Nehru's senior officials as "moral containment." This policy consists of publicly welcoming Communist China's peace propaganda, advertising it as widely as possible and attempting to extract more and more specific assurances of peaceful intent from the Peiping regime, on the theory that putting the spotlight on its peaceful professions will make it more difficult for Communist China to indulge in more expansionist activities. The great emphasis Nehru has given in his public speeches to the "five principles" enunciated by Nehru and Chou En-lai in June 1954, is part of this technique.

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Policy toward

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-66-

Policy toward Asia and the Near East

As the largest and most powerful nation in South Asia, Indian interpretations of world events have considerable influence with other nations in this area from Afghanistan to Indonesia. India influence is particularly strong with Burma and Indonesia, countries which have also recently emerged from colonial status. India has indicated that the territorial integrity of Burma is a matter of special concern and that India could not be disinterested in any violation of it. The close personal understanding between Burmese Premier Thakin Nu and Indian Prime Minister Nehru further strengthens the bond between the two nations. In January 1949 India also took the initiative of sponsoring a conference in New Delhi in behalf of Indonesian independence. At this conference 19 nations adopted a resolution calling upon the Security Council to take firm and definite steps to reestablish the Indonesian Republic, end Dutch aggression, and free Indonesian leaders. Since that time relations between the two nations have been very friendly.

Indian relations with Ceylon have been somewhat strained as a result of Ceylon's virtual disenfranchisement of Indian minorities in Ceylon. The economic and political rights of the Indians, mostly Tamils who work on the tea and rubber plantations, are still under negotiation between the two governments. Like other nations of South Asia Pakistan's foreign policies are determined by much the same considerations and points of view as guide India. Pakistan, however, is so anxious to emphasize its independence of India that Pakistan generally takes pains to avoid the semblance of following India's lead.

India consistently has taken an active interest in all efforts toward regional cooperation. When India became independent in 1947 it appeared anxious to participate in and to lead an Asian regional organization composed of all the major Asian states. At the end of World War II the Indian expectation apparently was that nationalism in Asia would be the cohesive force necessary to bring the nations together and that this would have sufficient strength to outweigh the factors tending to pull some of the nations into the orbit of the two major power blocs. India apparently hoped that a grouping of Asian nations might act as a "third force" between the power blocs and as a mediatory influence upon them. Other motivating factors were the increased prestige that would be India's as a leader of this third bloc and the natural Indian desire to see Asian nations play a more prominent and influential role in world affairs.

With the unofficial support of the government, the Indian Council of World Affairs in the spring of 1947 convened a 10-day conference in Delhi of representatives of international relations study groups from Asian

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SECRET

SECRET

-67-

countries and observers from U.S., U.K., and Australian organizations to discuss world affairs, with particular reference to Asia. The Inter-Asian Conference set up a small permanent secretariat at Delhi to carry on a program of research and publication. A second conference was scheduled to be held in China in 1949 but the Chinese Civil War intervened.

The New Delhi Conference on Indonesia in January 1949 was the independent government's first official effort to bring Asian nations together to discuss a mutual problem. Attendance, however, was limited to nations of South and Southeast Asia. Considerable discussion in closed sessions was devoted to the question of whether the conference should recommend creation of a permanent regional organization, but by this time India was hesitant about the idea and, upon Nehru's insistence that the time was inopportune for creating such an organization, the question was dropped. However, the conference passed two resolutions which recommended that the nations keep in close touch with each other through normal diplomatic channels, instruct their UN representatives to consult among themselves, and explore ways and means of establishing suitable machinery for the purpose of promoting consultation within the framework of the UN.

By January 1949 the position of the Chinese National Government was very tenuous and the possibility of a change of government in China introduced a new factor into the picture of an Asian regional organization. To India, a regional organization without China was unthinkable, but a Communist China undermined the basic concept of nonalignment, and differences of view with respect to the merits of the new government were likely to prevent effective cooperation among all Asian nations.

In 1950 when the Philippine Government called the next conference of Asian nations at Baguio, it was evident that the Asian nations -- exclusive of the uninvited Communist Chinese and North Korean governments -- were divided in intent and that not only were the Indian and Philippine governments vying for Asian leadership but that they represented two conflicting views on the purpose of an Asian regional organization. The Philippines favored a strong anti-Communist stand whereas India still advocated a regional grouping more in line with India's own policy of nonalignment.

Common interests and points of view have also led the nations of the Near East into increasingly close cooperation with Asian countries in the UN. Although there have been some unofficial expressions of sympathy and support for Muslim Pakistan the nations of the Near East generally have

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SECRET

-68-

been careful to refrain from involvement in the disputes and rivalry between India and Pakistan. India has generally sympathized with nationalist demands in the Near East and these nations in turn have looked to India for support of such demands.

Many of the Near Eastern nations have problems similar to those of some nations in Asia; all are underdeveloped and need a long period of international peace and extensive capital and expenditure; all occupy fairly exposed positions along the Soviet border; and most of them have at one time or another experienced colonial rule. These factors have disposed virtually all of these nations to favor in varying degrees a policy of noninvolvement in the East-West conflict and to take similar views on many other international issues. (55-29 to 33)

India is not interested in the formation of an Asian Bloc in the sense of a military alliance, but is in favor of bringing together as many countries as possible who wish to take an independent stand in the East-West conflict and act as a neutral force. The countries of South-east Asia and the Arab Bloc are of particular importance in this respect. Partly with a view to winning their support, India champions the nationalist cause wherever this comes into conflict with colonialism.

India's attitude towards the Commonwealth, of which she is a member, is in brief that it provides a forum for joint consultation on problems of common interest and imposes no restrictions on India's domestic or foreign policies. Although India has frequently taken an independent stand, and her relations with two of the Commonwealth countries, Pakistan and South Africa, are strained, her ties with the UK are close and friendly and she is probably more susceptible to influence exerted by the UK than by any other country.

India's attitude towards other Asian Powers is influenced by its position in the East-West conflict as well as by its desire to assume a position of leadership in Asia. Because most of the countries of South Asia face with India a common threat from the USSR and Communist China and as most of them have also been involved at one time or another in the struggle against Western colonialism, Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, and even Pakistan tend to be influenced by India's evaluation of international affairs and foreign policy. This has been particularly evident in the comment and reaction of these countries to developments in Asia. Although the mutual suspicions dividing India from Pakistan and Ceylon have in any case made the formation of a regional political bloc impossible, India itself has hitherto opposed any regional political alliance that might appear to be directed against the Soviet bloc. However, India's recent efforts to organize an Arab-Asian bloc in the UN to

SECRET

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SECRET

-69-

a neutral settlement of the Korean issue may be a precursor of similar attempts in the future. While India has opposed the formation of a regional political alliance, it has not been opposed to cooperating with the Commonwealth in a regional organization for the economic development of South and Southeast Asia. Thus India cooperated in the recent drafting of the Colombo Plan and is expected to play a leading role in its implementation.

Indians accuse the U.S. of favoring Pakistan in the Kashmir dispute and Pakistan's participation in a military aid pact with the US, the Manila Pact and Turkish-Pakistan pact, interpreted as a quid pro quo for US support. Under present circumstances, offers of similar treatment on arms supply would probably not be accepted. Attempts to reassure India with regard to possible Pakistani aggression or other guarantees by the Western powers will not go far towards lessening these adverse affects.

In general, India's foreign policy, as stated above, is independent of action by other Commonwealth countries, or "colonial" powers. Action taken by the UK, however, and to a certain extent by other Commonwealth powers, such as Canada or Australia, is likely to have some effect on Indian policy.

Intensification of the USSR's peace propaganda with or without offers of trade opportunities are not likely to draw India closer to the USSR. Effects of the peace propaganda can be discounted, and while India would doubtless avail herself of any advantageous opportunities to increase her trade in non-strategic commodities with either China or Russia, such trade probably would not effect her policy.

In spite of this desire for neutrality India dislikes and fears the policies of the USSR more than she does those of the western powers and realizes that should she have to abandon her neutrality, she would probably side with the west. India believes that the threat to world peace can best be met at the present time by weakening the USSR to the extent that she will no longer be in a position to pursue her aims by military means. To detach China from the Soviet orbit and thereby to reduce the USSR's strength is one of the immediate goals of India's foreign policy. She believes that there is a possibility of doing this, and that a necessary first step is to secure the recognition of the Chinese Communist government, and the admission of its representatives to the UN. India's friendly relations with Communist China are maintained partly with a view to weakening this country's ties with the Soviet Union. There is little evidence that to date India has made much progress in this direction. A feeling of "Pan-Asianism" and a strong desire to work out somehow a modus vivendi with a powerful neighbor also influence Indian attitudes towards the Chinese.

SECRET

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SECRET

-70-

Should India become convinced that her China policy had no hope of success, she would abandon this approach. It can be expected, however, that she will not substantially modify her general position of non-alignment in the East-West struggle, unless and until she feels that her own vital interests are at stake.

Increased support of subversive elements in India by the USSR or China would probably have an adverse effect on Indian attitudes toward these countries, but would probably not have any practical effect on relations between the countries concerned unless it should reach such proportions as to endanger governmental stability. Within her own borders India apparently feels capable of dealing with subversive activities on the part of Indian Communists. Should Soviet or Chinese support of subversion within the principalities along India's border, particularly in Nepal, be materially increased, India would probably be forced to build up her defense program.

Further diplomatic rebuffs from China may have, cumulatively, the effect of discouraging India in her efforts to detach China from the Soviet orbit, but she is not likely to desist altogether from her attempts, nor to abandon hope of eventual success until aggressive action on China's part in some area vital to India's security makes friendly relations with China impossible.

India will react most unfavorably to Communist military intervention in Southeast Asia, particularly in Burma, but less so in Iran or Afghanistan. There is evidence that India is already apprehensive of China's intentions with regard to South and Southeast Asia, and such action would increase her fears for her own safety, and would lead her to intensify her defense program. It is probable, also, that India would contribute troops, at least in token numbers, to any UN force which might be formed to defend Burma in a case of Communist aggression against this country. In a similar case affecting Iran, Afghanistan, or any of the Southeast Asia countries more remote than Burma from her own borders, India's participation is doubtful, and would probably depend on the circumstances and the general international situation.

#### Attitudes towards the UK and the Commonwealth

The decision of the Labor Government to make a full and prompt transfer of power in virtually all of Britain's colonies in Asia at the end of the war, the general decline in Britain's position as a world power, and the Socialist policies of the UK have combined to dissipate most Indian hostility

SECRET

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SECRET

-71-

towards the UK and to replace it with considerable sympathy and even admiration. Most Indian leaders are now convinced that the UK has neither the desire nor the strength to control political events in Asia. The general support for India's decision to stay in the Commonwealth is primarily the result of the marked improvement in the atmosphere of Indo-British relations, the desire to retain valuable military aid as well as important trade and business relations, and the desire to obtain the full repayment of the UK's sterling debt to India. Undoubtedly the strengthening of Indo-British ties has also been influenced by UK attitudes toward India: the anxiety to make concessions and to adjust the Commonwealth formula in order to retain India as a member, the consultation and exchange of information on major issues of policy, particularly in the field of Asian affairs, and finally the readiness to provide the initiative and considerable financial aid for a program of economic development for South Asia. Although India's policy of neutrality and the nationalistic pride of a newly-independent country has led the government to play down its relations with the UK, the British are making an important if unpublicized contribution in helping dispose the leaders of Indian public opinion towards Western, though not always, US, points of view.

SECRET

SECRET  
-72-

## Stage II

B-1-e. Do Indians cherish deeply certain elements of their national life?

- (1) Would these include democracy, independence, religion, property and way of life?
- (2) Others?

### Indian Art

Educated Indians are proud of their ancient traditions of art and intellectual life and are inclined to take the view that their country's industrial and technical deficiencies when compared with the West are more than compensated by India's past intellectual and artistic accomplishments. Indian art is a rallying point today for patriotism, nationalism, and self-esteem. The great art creations of the past have become national symbols. The official state insignia is the likeness of the capital of the Asoka pillar at Sarnath and the stamps of the country are representations of the country's great architectural monuments and temples. The latter have replaced the picture of the British monarch. (42-19)

### Indian Religion

Religion plays a major role in India, Nepal and the French and Portuguese colonies of the subcontinent in shaping the general outlook of the population. Religion has dominated the philosophic thought of the region, and basic philosophic concepts permeate popular thought and attitudes even though the philosophies themselves are beyond the grasp of the ordinary man. This pervasive role of religion in the life of an Indian is in marked contrast to the highly pragmatic and humanistic cultures of both China and the West. Religious values tend to be viewed as the only ones having any real or permanent significance, while social and economic values tend to be discounted as temporary and illusory; men who devote themselves to religion command popular respect and often excite widespread reverence and devotion; many customs and objects, such as the cow, in Hinduism have acquired sacred significance; religious pilgrimages are a common feature of the social scene; and offenses to religious sentiment can provoke fanatical retaliation. (43-1)

### Right of the Individual to Participate in Government

From the most ancient times, self-contained and self-sufficient village republics handled life in India. Everything was taken care of by the village, which was governed by its elders, the panchayat; economics, justice, home and foreign affairs. Relations with a provincial government or a ruler were

SECRET

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SECRET

-73-

confined to tributes and taxes .....After the advent of the British, centralization set in and the responsibility and portent of village government receded, the feeling of civic responsibility died out. Caste and clan responsibilities remained.

As to the right of individuals to participate in government, Hinduism proper knows of nothing else. The four castes had a say in everything, and in the villages representatives of the outcastes were members of the panchayats, thus participating in village government .....The first all-Indian election of 1952, the first ever to have taken place in the country, proved a revelation to the rest of the world .... The staggering participation in the first election also exploded the old adage that participation in elections is linked to literacy. The great majority of the voters was illiterate. Yet they had....understood the issue of voting and fulfilled their electoral duty.....The principle of adult franchise had been thoroughly understood: not because it was a pleasing importation from the West, but because participation in their own government lies in the tradition of India, for many thousand years.

#### Freedom

For the non-Westernized Indian, freedom means that an individual is free to do what he wants to do under certain social laws and in conformity with social and moral codes. These codes have been established by certain historical or mythological persons; they have been added to, amplified, commented upon.....The small minority of Westernized Indians hold, according to the completeness of their westernization in greater or lesser degree, the same views as we do.....Couched in Western terminology, the Constitution of India ....expresses the concept of freedom in politics to be practiced in the middle of the twentieth century and thereafter.

#### Property

The joint household system has often been called the backbone of Indian economy. In a joint household, parents live in the same house or, at least, the same compound with their sons, their daughters-in-law, their grandchildren and great-grandchildren. Their own parents, widowed, old or infirm live with them, too, as often do their own younger brothers with their families. At the marriage of each son or grandson a room or a house is added to the family abode.

All the earnings of each individual go to the common exchequer. Whatever property and money there is, belong to the family as a whole, not to an individual. The eldest son, as before him his father, bears the chief responsibility for looking after the family's affairs and the welfare of each of its members .....As each male member of the family shares in the family property to which he joins his individual earnings, -- women are taken care of by their husbands, fathers or brothers -- there

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-74-

is no need for social security or old age pensions.

Money, .....means a great deal in India. It is carefully hoarded and sparingly spent by those who own it. The bulk of moneyed Indians do not, as yet, go in for banking. They take care of their surplus in their own way: land, jewels, gold or silver bars, grain speculations and so on. But however much money might mean, the "vanaprasta" and "sannyasi" who relinquished it earns more respect and reverence than he who owns it.

#### Democracy

Democracy is not new to India. Through their panchayats, the people of India enjoyed the rights and duties or responsible self-government many thousand years ago.

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SECRET

-75-

## Stage II

B-1-f. Are the Indians working towards goals of economic and social development?

(1) How much have they done and planned on their own?

The government is keenly aware of the difficult economic problems confronting the country and is attempting to work out some solution through a combination of different measures. It has invited birth control and population experts to examine the problems of population control and some tentative measures have begun to be explored but the greatest handicap to this approach has been the lack of a sufficiently cheap and simple contraceptive the use of which could be widely adopted in rural areas. However, the three major policies on which the government is relying to combat the challenge of population pressure are: 1) the control of basic commodities, 2) land reform, and 3) the initiation of a countrywide development program.

The government's commodity control measures vary in pattern and alter from time to time, but, taken together, constitute essentially a holding operation designed to assure the population of its minimum grain and clothing requirements. Through these measures the government has prevented one major and several minor threatened famines; has helped India's two major industries, cotton and jute textiles, obtain their raw material needs and has assisted in the maintenance of a continuous and more equitable distribution of certain basic consumer goods with the result that food and cloth riots have been nipped in the bud and the severe inflationary pressures in the economy have been kept under fairly effective control. These gains, however, have been achieved at the cost of some increase in the country's dependence on foreign grain and cotton imports and of arousing popular discontent, particularly in the food-deficit areas of south India where the cultivators have resented the government's compulsory grain procurement program and the rationed population have been critical of the size and quality of the ration.

The government's second line of attack in meeting the problem of low production has been to bring pressure on most of the larger states to enact land reform legislation since under the Indian constitution land reform is under the jurisdiction of the states. There are wide variations in the system of landholding in different parts of the country and there is considerable variation in the land reform measures adopted. In the main, however, the legislation either enables the transfer of land from the landlords to the tenant cultivators or strengthens the legal rights of the cultivators. The major objective of the land reform program has been to give the cultivator an incentive to increase his production by satisfying his urge for ownership,

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SECRET

-76-

or at least by giving him the right to retain some of the benefits of any production increase he may achieve. Although most of the major states have enacted the necessary legislation, only a small number of land transfers have actually been effected. The rates of compensation are relatively modest but only the most well-to-do tenant cultivators have been able to afford the necessary payments which amount to several times the annual rental of the land. The result has been a growing tide of criticism among the rural population over the ineffectiveness of the legislation. (55-3)

After a great deal of detailed survey work and quite a bit of actual project experience the government drafted, revised, and finally, in mid-1951, initiated "The First Five-Year Plan." The major objective of this plan was to mobilize government and private resources behind a multi-purpose development program with the aim of stepping up the tempo of agricultural production. The government hopes that if it succeeds in this objective later plans can build upon the first to achieve a steadily expanding and sound economy.

Because the variability in the monsoon rainfall leaves agriculture in two-thirds of the country particularly dependent on irrigation an important part of the plan is devoted to hydroelectric development and irrigation. The other major features of the plan include: 1) agriculture and rural development through the production of fertilizer, improved seed and equipment, and the widescale expansion of agricultural extension services; 2) some expansion of railway and road transport to facilitate marketing and distribution; 3) some expansion of both regular and village industries to produce incentive goods and a few of the basic commodities required in other parts of the program; and 4) some extension of public health and education.

The plan has involved a great deal of study and all of the measures proposed have been designed to meet long-recognized needs. There is also little doubt that if the full plan could be implemented by the scheduled date of 1956 most of the goals of increased production could be achieved. A good start was made during the first year. However, it seems doubtful that the government will be able to find sufficient funds or technically qualified personnel for the full implementation of the rest of the program. The government recognizes that it will need foreign assistance to do the job but it feels that it is humiliating to ask for aid and that politically it cannot afford to appear to be in any way dependent on outside help. Accordingly, it has announced that it will welcome all proffers of foreign assistance, but that it intends to try to implement the program whether foreign aid is forthcoming or not.

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Industrial Policy

SECRET

-77-

### Industrial Policy

Before independence the Indian National Congress Party supported a policy of controlled development of industry. This policy was never spelled out in detail, but the more socialist wing of the party under Nehru's leadership made it clear that in their view the major objectives of this policy were: 1) the rapid industrialization of the country, 2) the prevention of any unfair exploitation of labor by capital, and 3) the prevention of any foreign exploitation of India's resources in disregard to the people's own interests and needs. When the new government came to power in 1947, however, it found that the immediate need was to arrest the postwar decline in industrial production and replace important new material supplies lost to Pakistan with partition. The government soon began to recognize that there was little possibility of introducing immediate major changes into the existing industrial structure. The primary need for increased production made the government hesitate to take any step that might interfere with the output of an operating industry, even temporarily. Furthermore, the growing demands on the government's limited amount of financial resources and trained personnel underlined the hazards of undertaking greater responsibilities. Added to these considerations was the pressure exerted by business interests in the party against any general extension of government ownership.

Nevertheless, some of the party's top-ranking leadership, and particularly Nehru, were anxious to steer the economy along socialist lines. This leadership, with the support of large segments of educated Indian opinion, inclines to the view that socialist solutions are often more suited to Indian conditions than capitalist ones. Several factors contribute to this point of view. First, most Indian businessmen have a very poor public reputation because of their business methods which are generally geared toward a quick, lucrative return with a minimum of long term investment and with little interest in the upkeep of plant or equipment or in the development of good labor or public relations. Furthermore, Indian society is still permeated with the idea that devoting one's time and energies to the making of money is a mercenary and degrading occupation. Secondly, Indian businessmen themselves recognize their lack of experience and continue to look to government or to foreign capital to develop any new fields of investment. Thirdly, capitalism in Indian eyes tends to be closely identified with imperialism: because it had been a British trading and business company (the East Indian Trading Company) which had undertaken the military conquest of the country; and because the British government, when it later assumed direct control, declared as its avowed objectives the assistance and protection of British industrial and trading interests. Finally, the opinion of educated Indians has been considerably influenced by the ideas and ideals of British socialists, including such personalities as G. D. H. Cole, the Webbs, Cripps and Attlee, whom they regard as being of high intellectual caliber and moral character. The fact that these British

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-78-

socialists gave positive support for Indian nationalist aspiration prior to independence, and have criticized capitalism on moral and social grounds strongly appealed to Indian sentiment. Accordingly, the Nehru government, in its formulation of industrial policy, has attempted to work out a compromise between capitalism and socialism by assigning certain fields of industry to government control and leaving others to private development.

The government's first Industrial Policy statement on April 6, 1948 envisaged government control in different degrees for three spheres of economic activity. In the first sphere the central government claimed exclusive monopoly and full control; this was the sphere which the former British Government of India had controlled and included the manufacture of arms and ammunition, the production and control of atomic energy, and the ownership and operation of the railways, posts, telegraph, telephone and radio. An important additional proviso was that the government could take over any industry in a national emergency. The second sphere, in which all new enterprises were to be the responsibility of the government, comprised the following six industries: coal; mineral oils; iron and steel; aircraft manufacture; shipbuilding; and the manufacture of telephone, telegraph, and wireless apparatus exclusive of radio sets. The third sphere, comprising the rest of the industrial field, was to be left to private capital, with the expectation that the state might participate jointly in new enterprises. In addition certain industries were to be subject to central government regulation and control, including principally, salt, automobiles and tractors, electrical engineering, fertilizers, pharmaceutical products and drugs, nonferrous metals, machine tools, and cement. Foreign capital and technical skill were acknowledged as valuable, but their employment was to be carefully regulated in the national interest.

Government policies to increase agricultural production also have had some success but their scope has been too limited to assure any measurable improvement in the standard of living of more than a small fraction of the total population. During World War II the British predecessor government launched a "Grow More Food" campaign which was continued and substantially expanded by the independent government of India with the objective of making the country virtually self-sufficient in food-grains by 1951. The program combines the production and increased distribution of fertilizer, improved seeds, and farm implements with the repair and expansion of wells and canals, the provision of contour plowing and other similar conservation services, tractor reclamation of weed-infested land, and the installation of tube wells. As a result it is estimated that agricultural production has increased by the equivalent of about 1,000,000

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-79-

tons of foodgrains in the first five years of India's independence. Unfortunately, these increases were more than offset by the combination of floods followed by partial failure of the monsoon rains in 1950 and 1951. Furthermore, although the increases have meant better diets for the producing areas concerned, since virtually none of the increases has been available for distribution to other areas, the country's general food problem still remains unsolved.

The government has also started four large-scale irrigation projects (Bhakra-Nangal, Hirakud, Damodar, and Tungabhadra) which will rank among some of the largest in the world and which are designed to increase India's grain production by 2,272,000 tons. These still require another 7 to 10 years to complete and at least another 3 to 5 years of work before a preliminary production increase of more than 500,000 tons can be expected. Finally, in addition to the "Grow More Food" campaign and the large-scale irrigation projects, the Indian Government has launched a few community development projects. These projects have differed widely, but where agricultural production has been increased in conjunction with multi-purpose development (the combined development of local industries, cooperative societies, improved housing, health, and educational facilities) the increases achieved in income, production, and in general living conditions has been much more marked than in areas aided only by the "Grow More Food" campaign. The government hopes to use the experience gained in these projects as a guide in working out the more comprehensive community development program inaugurated in the spring of 1952 with U.S. Point IV assistance. Under this program some projects are to be started in every major region of the country to reach more than 16,000 villages and about 12,000,000 people.

Some progress has also been made towards achieving the Congress Party government's social objectives. A system of free and compulsory "basic" education for children up to 14 years of age is being extended in several of the states and a program combining literacy and social education for adults has been started. Employment exchanges, unemployment and sickness benefits to workers in organized industry, and general medical and health facilities have also been extended and some study begun on the problems of nutrition.

Major hopes of the Congress Party government, however, are pinned on the initiation of a nationwide development program. The government recognizes that its commodity controls are only ameliorative measures and that a solution of India's food problem requires a substantial and fairly rapid increase in the country's actual grain production to offset

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-80-

the expanding population coupled with an adequate supply of incentive goods or special benefits to the cultivator which will induce him to sell a maximum of his production for distribution to the rest of the population. Similarly, the government recognizes that any land reform program can provide only a partial answer to the landholding problems since there are already far too many agricultural laborers for the land available. Indian agricultural economists have begun to point out that alternative employment must be found for a substantial proportion of the 20 million landless agricultural laborers as well as for several million of the tenants with only partial land occupancy rights, who are currently cultivating uneconomic sized holdings.

In mid-1951 the Government of India initiated a Five Year Plan of economic development which is being revised in the light of initial project experience and detailed consultations with the individual states. As the plan is primarily designed to lay the foundations for a continuing economic development program for India study and revision of the program will probably also be a continuing process. The first tentative Five-Year Plan is scheduled to extend from fiscal 1951-52 to fiscal 1955-56 and its primary emphasis is on agricultural production. In view of India's major dependence on the vagaries of the monsoon, an important part of the plan is devoted to expansion of irrigation, supplemented by a number of other programs for increasing agricultural production including extension services, and the expansion of power, transport and fertilizer production facilities. In addition some provision is made for the increase of machine and cottage industry production which might serve to increase supplies of incentive goods and relieve the pressure on agriculture by providing new employment opportunities. The government is more concerned with initiating a practical working development program than with the achievement of specific production goals. However, there is little doubt that if the plan were fully implemented by the target date of 1956 the estimated increases of more than 7 million tons in grain production could well be achieved. Furthermore, the political benefits that could be expected to accompany such notable increases in agricultural production would be a major asset in countering Communist activities in rural areas and in assisting the Congress Party Government to contest the next elections which must normally be scheduled for not later than 1956. A full and effective implementation of the development program by 1956, however, would require a substantial amount of foreign aid to supply much of the specialized equipment, technical training, and personnel, and to help produce or procure the necessary incentive goods which are currently lacking in the country. As of June 1952, however, there is no definite prospect that more than a relatively small fraction of the foreign aid requirements will be forthcoming. Although a number of projects have already been started and the government has announced its intention of pushing forward on its own

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-81-

whether or not more foreign assistance becomes available, it is doubtful whether India's unaided efforts can achieve more than one-third of its goals. Domestic capital is inexperienced, and in the past either government or foreign initiative and capital have had to assume the major burden of developing new fields of production before domestic capital has become available in any quantity.

The Congress Party Government has begun to make some progress towards increasing the country's agricultural and industrial production under its economic development program and with the aid of US technical assistance. As of May 1954, however, the two major challenges confronting the country were: 1) whether the employment opportunities for the growing middle classes could be substantially expanded and improved or whether these groups, who have been the main source of Communist recruitment in the past, would increasingly turn to Communist panaceas of full employment and rapid economic development, and 2) whether with the growth of political consciousness the rural population, who hitherto have been largely passive spectators of the political scene, will continue to support parties working for gradual economic improvement, or will be won over by Communist propaganda of "land for the tiller," "reduction of agricultural debt," and concern for peasant welfare. (50-28)

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-82-

Stage II

B-1-f (2)      Do cultural factors affect Indian attitudes towards developments?

Because Hinduism, the most prevalent religion, is a religio-socio-economic system, it sets the pattern not only for religious attitudes and philosophic thought, but also for social relationships and economic organization. Hindus comprise approximately three-fourths of the population in India and the French settlements, about two-thirds of the population of Goa and the Portuguese settlements. As a religion, Hinduism is tolerant and catholic, embracing widely divergent types of worship and belief, from simple forms of primitive animism to the most highly developed forms of mysticism and metaphysics. Although social and economic reforms per se are not considered spiritual objectives, the goal of complete selflessness, revered by all religions of the country, has led to the development of the idea of selfless service to society, as illustrated by the work of Mohandas Gandhi and of the Servants of India Society. At the same time the strong emphasis on pure spirit and the common belief that life itself is essentially the product of illusion has resulted in a tendency to neglect or even to disregard the value of the individual. Finally, the Hindu caste system has resulted in a fairly rigid stratification of society under which the upper castes enjoy marked social and economic privileges, while large low-caste and outcaste groups suffer serious social and economic disabilities, although all can share in the general traditions and larger life of the community. (43-1)

Capitalism's emphasis on competition, on "getting ahead", and on the production and acquisition of material goods are in direct conflict with some of the most fundamental ideals of Buddhism and Hinduism, which hold that man must detach himself from desire and free himself from dependence on material things. Although Islam is not an anti-materialist religion, the social organization and ideals of Muslims in South Asia are closely allied to those of their Buddhist and Hindu neighbors; emphasis is placed on cooperation rather than competition and on the importance of the social unit -- the family or the village community -- rather than of the individual. Finally, the displacement of handicraft workers and the slum living conditions of many factory workers has encouraged a feeling that the use of machines is immoral and degrading. This attitude has been given particular emphasis in the last few decades through the teachings of Gandhi which have had a widespread influence throughout South Asia.

To make economic progress the country will require a substantial increase in the training of technically qualified personnel. This increase can be realized only if academic emphasis is reoriented.... Even so, technical instruction confronts major problems in India today. First, there is the prejudice based on the Hindu belief that a man is born into his occupation,

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-83-

which he must follow even though unskillfully rather than undertake another's occupation, no matter how well qualified for it he might be. This attitude, together with the fact that most handwork occupations are assigned to the Sudra or lowest group of castes, has made students in the upper three caste groups reluctant to take up technical education. Secondly, most Indian industries have been unwilling to recruit high school or technical school graduates and to let them develop experience on the job. Instead industries tend to employ persons who, because of their experience in a particular caste occupation, already possess some knowledge and technical skill.

During World War II many young men and women joined the technical services and were trained as skilled or semi-skilled workers. Age-old prejudices began to break down and a beginning was made toward developing technical education on practical and up-to-date lines. (43-23)

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-84-

Stage II

B-1-f (3)      How strongly do the masses desire improvement of material conditions?

In the past the bulk of the population has tended to passively accept meager standards of living. The awakening political consciousness among India's vast rural population during the past few decades, however, has already begun to provide subversive groups with a favorable climate in which to whip up popular discontent over age-old economic and social inequalities. (57-1)

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-85-

Stage II

B-1-g. Have the Indians a vigorous tradition of political consciousness and activity?

Similarly, the rise in political consciousness and the steady expansion in educational facilities has broken the Brahman monopoly on social and intellectual leadership. Brahmans still continue to exercise much of their traditional leadership in village life and the emphasis of the Brahman caste on intellectual attainment enables its members to play a dominant role in the fields of politics, law, and education. (43-2)

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-86-

Stage II

B-1-g (1). Is the government apparatus now or potentially capable of controlling communist pressure?

The police have shown themselves to be acutely aware of the Communist menace and are prepared to take drastic measures against any indication of Communist violence. (54-1)

Despite certain successes of the government's anti-communist policy the record of the 1951-52 elections indicate that the communists will probably continue to gain in strength as their "legal" tactics make it difficult for the government to move against them on legal grounds,.....The Communists have also had some success in exploiting popular sympathy through charges of government oppression and appeals for the defense of civil rights. The government, however, is now even more alert to the communist danger and apparently intends to make full use of preventive detention ordinances and its new constitutional powers. (55-16)

Both the military and police forces of India are loyal to the Congress Party government and have played an important role in maintaining law and order and in quelling threats of violence from both the right and the left. (50-8)

This section might also include reference to several other techniques used by the Indian Government to control the Communists.

1. The Preventive Detention Act, passed at the behest of the Congress Government, enables the Government to hold suspected subversives without trial for 12 months. This act has probably been most frequently used against the Communists.
2. Government restrictions prevent Communist propaganda activity among the Indian armed forces. The Government has also restricted the sale of Communist literature in railway stations, since they are Government property.
3. Passports and visas have been denied both domestic and foreign Communists on several occasions. In 1952, for example, eight Indians were refused passports for the Moscow Economic Conference, since the Indian Government did not think "the grant of passports to them would be in the public interest." At least one Communist member of Parliament was among the eight. (However, 36

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-87-

passports were granted to Indians who wished to attend). In 1954, the Indian Government reportedly refused visas to several foreign Communists, including an Indonesian, German and Australian, all of whom wished to come to India as "fraternal delegates" to the Third Congress of the Communist Party of India at Madura.

4. Congress Party leaders in the Indian states have been warned not to participate in Communist-sponsored rallies and other "front" activities, so they would not lend prestige and respectability to Communist causes.

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SECRET

-88-

Stage II

B-1-g (2). What circumstances do or might arouse in the Indian people intense feeling on political questions?

Situations or developments which conflict with basic Indian attitudes or deeply ingrained prejudices, in both the fields of foreign and domestic affairs, do and might arouse intense feeling on political questions.

1. Regionalism: Pride in linguistic and cultural group has led to considerable agitation for realignment of state boundaries to conform with linguistic and cultural areas. Any belief that the central government is neglecting a particular region, is favoring one area over another, or is frustrating regional aspirations can result in intense political feeling. Another expression of regionalism is the controversy over the constitutional decision to replace English as the official language with Hindi, a north Indian language.

2. Caste: The problem of caste can also arouse many Indians. The present Congress government regards caste as an anachronism hindering political and social progress in a modern state and the Constitution prohibits any public discrimination on grounds of caste and specifically abolishes untouchability. Such policies have aroused opposition, especially among more conservative Hindu groups. Caste rivalries are also at the root of much political factionalism, particularly in South India where they take the form mainly of conflict between Brahman and non-Brahman groups.

3. Communalism vs. Secularism: The establishment of a secular state in India has been vigorously opposed by militant Hindu and Sikh groups, including several political parties. These groups blame the Congress Party's special concessions to minority groups and particularly to Muslims for the partition of the country, all the sufferings of non-Muslim refugees from Pakistan, and the difficulties and periodic crises in Indo-Pakistani relations. Government-sponsored reform proposals in Hindu law and social customs arouse intense opposition from these groups. Such issues as cow-slaughter also arouse political feeling, with the religious conservatives generally supporting proposed legislation to prohibit it.

~~Certain problems identified by foreign officials may also arouse intense political feeling in India, although knowledge of these matters is more likely limited to the literate public.~~

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1. Colonialism:



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-89-

1. Colonialism: Most Indians, as a result of their own struggle against colonial rule, are very sympathetic with nationalist movements throughout Asia and Africa, and tend to react emotionally to any suggestion that colonial powers are suppressing the aspirations of colonial peoples or are seeking to reassert their control in these areas.

2. Racialism: Indians are generally extremely sensitive on matters of race and strongly resent any evidence of racial discrimination, especially by Western countries in their dealings with colored groups within their borders or with Asian or African countries. Thus incidents in South Africa, especially vis-a-vis the Indian minority, arouse considerable feeling in India. Indian sensitivity on the subject of race also played a part in the strong reaction against US hydrogen bomb tests in the Pacific, which many Indians considered as an indication of the fact that Americans cared little for the life and health of Asians.

3. India's Foreign Policy: Indians tend to be sensitive to real or imagined criticism of their foreign policy, and to resent any indications that their position in the cold war is misunderstood, especially by the West. A combination of nationalism and anti-colonialism has disposed politically conscious Indians to take the view that the peoples of Asia and Africa have their own interests independent of the Western or the Soviet power blocs and that they should determine their future development substantially free of pressures or influence from either of these blocs. Thus criticism, especially if it is based on what Indians believe to be a misunderstanding of their position, tends to offend their nationalist sentiments and also their self-esteem as the largest newly-independent nation of this area. There is also growing resentment among politically conscious Indians who believe that the Western powers are attempting to shape the future of Asia to suit the strategy of the cold war with little reference to the desires of free Asian countries. Thus the Afro-Asian conference is considered important as a forum for the expression of Asian and African views, and any real or imagined effort by Western countries to interfere with the meeting will be considered as further evidence that the West does not wish to take "free Asia's" views into account.

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-90-

Stage II

B-1-h. Are there minority problems?

Except for the Anglo-Indian community, most minorities in India are religious groups .....These include Muslims, Tribals, Sikhs, Christians, Jains, and others -- some 85,000,000 people of a total population of 361,000,000 as against 275,000,000 Hindus. (42-25)

The major minority problem is the century old Muslim-Hindu conflict. This conflict culminated during the struggle for independence as a result of the rivalry for jobs, political office and influence in creation of the separate Muslim state of Pakistan. This resulted in the movement of 6,000,000 Muslims from India to Pakistan and some 4,500,000 Hindus and 3,000,000 Sikhs who entered India from Pakistan territory. These refugees in India have been a serious problem as not all have been satisfactorily settled and they have become bitter and are ".....inclined to support politicians who favor a 'tough' policy toward the Muslims still in India". (42-25)

The refugee movement has been confined largely to the eastern and western border areas. In the rest of the country Hindu-Muslim relations appear to have returned to a generally peaceful status. (42-25)

Because of the persecution of the Sikhs by the Muslims in the past the Sikhs have maintained a traditional hostility toward the Muslims. The Sikhs opposed the 1947 partition of their home territory, the Punjab, and, as a result of the communal riots which followed, some 3,000,000 Sikhs in West Pakistan were forced to evacuate to India and virtually all Muslims were forced out of East Punjab. Many of the Sikhs therefore support a stronger policy against Pakistan, and against Muslims in India. (42-26)

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-91-

B-1-h (1). Do the minorities suffer from insecurities and unsatisfied aspirations?

The 7,500,000 Hindu and Sikh refugees from Pakistan have by no means all found adequate housing or work equivalent to their employment before partition. (42-25)

Since independence considerable Sikh energy has.....been directed into competition with the Hindus for political position and power in East Punjab and into agitation for the reorganization of the Punjab into a Sikh state. (42-26)

The Jains, although few in number, exercise considerable social and economic influence as a result of their prominence in banking and commercial circles .....Their comparatively high economic level and their literary rate of 38.2% (in 1931) give them a respected position in society. (42-26)

The Christian community of 6,500,000 is more in step with the modernization taking place in India today than most other groups. They have a higher literary rate than the Hindus and Muslims and more of them know English. The advantages in social and economic competition derived from Westernization will probably more than compensate for the disadvantage of humble social origin and identification with the somewhat unpopular West. (42-26)

There are some 28,500,000 aborigines in India. For the most part they are in some degree of contact with Indian society, and are at one stage or another in the process of assimilation. Until a group merges with non-primitive Indians there is a period of maladjustment and insecurity accompanied by a breakdown of the tribal culture. Speculators from the civilized areas deprive the primitives of their means of subsistence and often reduce them to the status of landless laborers. At times government restrictions worked against them. Assimilation, the only ultimate answer, is generally into the lower caste levels of Hindu society. A more favorable alternative is conversion to Christianity. (42-27)

The Anglo-Indians, of whom there are about 150,000 in India today, are of combined British and Indian ancestry. At first the British approved and later disapproved of mixed marriages. The Anglo-Indian minority sank socially until they were a minority ostracized by the British and Indians. With development of nationalism their position became more precarious, for they were suspected of being in sympathy with the British. (42-27)

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-92-

Stage II

B-1-h (2).      How does the majority look upon the minorities?

The cow-venerating Hindus look with horror upon Muslim beef-eating and on certain occasions the sacrifice of cows. The Hindu caste system and the Muslim seclusion of women inhibit somewhat friendly relations between the two groups. (42-26)

The relatively few (125,000) but highly literate Parsees, who are the most Westernized Indians, exert a wide influence because of their wealth and great business and industrial successses. This combination of Westernization and favoured economic position, however, does not endear the Parsee to other Indians; in particular, orthodox Hindus dislike having so much control of the motion pictures in "alien" hands. (42-26)

Members of tribal communities are frequently treated on a par with the scheduled castes because of their diet or other customs which are considered unclean by Hindus. (43-13)

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-93-

Stage II

B-1-h (3). What are the official policies towards minorities?

The Government of India follows an official policy of secularism and tolerance with respect to all minorities and does not favor one religious minority as against another. (42-25)

The rights section of the constitution prohibits any public discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth, makes the enforcement of any disability arising out of untouchability an offense punishable by law, and guarantees to all citizens the right to practice any profession, trade or business. In addition, freedom of conscience, and the right freely to profess, practice, and propagate religion are specifically guaranteed. Finally the state in granting financial aid to educational institutions, is prohibited from discriminating against religious institutions although no person and institution receiving state aid can be required to take part in religious instruction or worship without his own or his guardian's consent.

Despite the fact the country is 75% Hindu efforts are made not to discriminate against minorities in government functions and positions and in general. The government has continued the secular traditions and practices inherited from the British and there has been no marked tendency toward imposing essentially Hindu ideas on the general population. (43-12)

With respect to the Muslims the government has taken the position that they be accorded the same treatment as other religious communities. The central government sponsors the formal observance of major Muslim as well as Hindu religion celebrations. Officials have been generally prompt and firm in quelling Hindu-Muslim riots.

Apart from the gradual decline in the feeling of antagonism between Hindus and Muslims arising out of the partition of the sub-continent there are two situations which continue to contribute to the insecurity of the Muslims, namely the demand of certain Sikh refugees for the expropriation of Muslim property in India to compensate for their losses in Pakistan and the discrimination exercised against Hindus in East Pakistan. The government has flatly disregarded the Sikh demands and took action to stop attack on Muslims in West Bengal. (43-13)

The Congress Party's attitude toward the Scheduled Castes and tribals was favourable conditioned by Gandhi's interest in improving their status.

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-94-

However, as they are widely scattered in thousands of villages "..... it would take a reeducation program of major proportions to break down the religious prejudice of centuries and to achieve any substantial implementation of the constitutional guarantees. The best hope for improvement is to provide better educational facilities for the depressed classes and revive self-governing village bodies in which all elements of the community are represented. (43-13)

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-95-

Stage II

B-1-h (4). Is the government capable of applying these policies or of obtaining satisfactory solutions?

Despite its official policy of secularism and tolerance vis-a-vis religious minorities the Hindu-Sikh refugee problem continue to be exploited by Hindu politicians and will continue to be a problem for some time. Even after the refugees have been absorbed, memories of the days after partition will probably persist and make difficult the development and maintenance of friendly Hindu-Muslim relations. (42-25)

The Christian community, consisting largely of converts and descendants of converts from the lower strata of Hindu society and from the aboriginal (tribal) religions, is not growing as fast as in the past, partly because of recent ameliorations of the conditions of the Scheduled Castes under Hinduism, but it is sufficiently well established to maintain itself as an important group. (42-26,27)

Although some evidence of discrimination are discernible, the Congress Party Government appears to be making a genuine effort to adhere to its ideal of a secular state; with 75 percent of the population Hindu, it is inevitable that Hindus dominate all ranks of government and all social and economic activities. Under the British a fixed proportion of government appointments were reserved for members of the leading minority communities, Muslims, Sikhs, scheduled castes, and in certain areas, tribals. The present government has abandoned these reservations except for the representation of scheduled caste and tribal communities in the legislatures since it feels that these two groups are still in need of special assistance. In fact the nondiscriminatory clauses of the constitution were amended in the summer of 1951 to enable the continuance of certain special assistance to backward groups. At the same time the government has tended to be more liberal in according recognition to substandard Hindu schools and to the Hindu system of Ayurvedic (based on the Veda) medicine while strictly interpreting regulations for non-Hindu or Western schools and for Western schools of medicine. In some areas cow slaughter has been prohibited with some detriment to Muslim butchers, who have been forced to concentrate on sheep and goats. Since no statistics are available on the relative proportion of Hindus and non-Hindus in government there is no way of checking discrimination in appointments. In the main, however, the government has continued the secular traditions and practices inherited from the British and there has been no marked tendency toward imposing essentially Hindu ideas on the general population. (43-12)

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SECRET

-96-

Stage II

- B-1-1. Are there other aspects of Indian culture and society which influence Indian attitudes towards the East-West conflict?

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-97-

## Stage II

- C. Do significant segments of Indian society hold views and attitudes which differ from those discussed above?

### Political Participation

In the Indian national election during the winter of 1951-52, 60 per cent of the eligible voters went to the polls. Among the Lucknow respondents the voting participation was somewhat higher -- about 67 per cent. This is in line with the expectation of a somewhat higher vote in India in an urban area. Curiously enough, there were practically no differences in amount of voting between the upper-educated and the lower-educated groups. In the United States such differences are marked, and in India we might expect this all the more in view of the poverty and ignorance of the uneducated classes, and their small exposure to mass communication. The explanation may lie in the strong element of personal appeal in Indian elections.

### Party Preference

A large proportion of the persons interviewed had no party preference or were unwilling to indicate a preference. Of those who did say which party they preferred, the Congress Party of Gandhi and Nehru had a wide lead, especially among the lower-educated groups. The communal, religiously oriented parties, the Jan Sangh and Mahasabha received a small number of votes, ranging from 3 per cent to 11 per cent, for all education and age groups. The two left-wing parties, the Communist and the Socialist apparently receive support in Lucknow largely from the young and the better-educated. Preferences for the Communists, particularly, are closely related to age and education. Thirteen per cent of the young, college-educated prefer the Communist Party over all others as compared with 7 per cent of the older college-educated and virtually none of the older respondents in the lower-educational categories.

### Knowledge of Indian National Leaders

About a fourth of the uneducated persons interviewed in Lucknow were unable to name national leaders other than Nehru, Gandhi and Patel. Among those who can name national leaders, the names of Subhas Chandra Bose, Pandit Pant, Rajendra Prasad, and Jaiprabash Narayan stand out. Bose, the Indian strong man who sided with the Nazis and Japanese during World War II was most mentioned even though he has been dead for 10 years. Pandit Pant

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-98-

and Prasad are understandably well-known due to their positions as head of the Congress Party and President of India, respectively. Narayan is a prominent Socialist who had embraced communism in his earlier years.

#### Reactions to a Legislative Act

As an example of the relative amount of information on national affairs, it is interesting to note that practically none of the lower-educated respondents had heard of the Preventive Detention Act, a previously passed piece of legislation which was being warmly debated in the government at the time of the study. This Act allowed the government to detain persons thought to be prejudicial to India's security. A large proportion of those who have heard of the Act are against it, fully half of the lower-educated and most of the college-educated. In general, the reactions to this and other politically-oriented questions indicates the greater degree of conservatism among the lower-educated and old Indians.

#### Views of Certain Foreign Nations

The Lucknow respondents were asked how they view Indians, and the peoples of four other nations: the British, Americans, Russians, and Chinese. Among a choice of twelve adjectives, here are the ones which they felt applied most aptly to the five nations:

The BRITISH are seen as "domineering", "intelligent" and "conceited."

The AMERICANS are seen as "progressive", "intelligent" and "domineering", also as "practical" and "conceited".

The RUSSIANS are seen as "hardworking", "brave", and "progressive."

The CHINESE are "backward", but "progressive" at the same time. They are also "hardworking."

The INDIAN self-image is of a people who are "backward", "generous", "brave" and "hardworking."

Almost all the Indians had an idea of what Indians were like, and most of them were able to choose adjectives for the British and Americans. Fewer of them had images of the Russians and Chinese. This is seen to be partly related to the degree of contact with foreign nations. The main personal contacts the Indians have had are naturally with the British, but the

Americans

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SECRET

-99-

Americans are a close second. The Chinese are next and there has been virtually no direct contact with Russians. The college-educated have had many more contacts than the lower-educated groups. Forty-six per cent of them have known and talked with British in the last four years, 41 per cent with Americans and 32 per cent with Chinese.

#### Word Images among Social Status Groups

There is a general tendency for the higher-status groups, the better-educated, higher-caste, higher economic class respondents to choose more favorable images of the Russians and Chinese and less favorable images of the Western countries. In terms of age and education, there is a markedly greater number of favorable Communist country choices among the young, college-educated. Among political party groups there is the expected preference for the Communist countries among the Communists and Socialists.

#### ORIENTATION TO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The amount of attention paid to international affairs by the people of Lucknow varies with their education and their exposure to the mass media. Among the college-educated, the recent news items most remembered were in the international field. In the lower-educated groups, those who could remember recent news items at all were apt to remember items about local or national affairs. The content of the news remembered was apt to be political for the higher-educated and economic for the lower-educated.

Knowledge about the United Nations: In order to see just how great was this divergency between groups on knowledge of international affairs, the Lucknow respondents were asked what they had heard about, and what they knew about the United Nations Organization. Practically none of the uneducated had any knowledge of the UNO at all, while practically all the college-educated at least know what it was. Of those who knew something of the UNO, only the college-educated had correct information as to its Director General.

Attitudes toward the United Nations: Most of the Indians who knew anything about the United Nations had negative attitudes toward it. They thought it was not doing a good job in trying to solve international problems. Very prominent among the reasons given, particularly by the college-educated, was a feeling that the UN was too much under the domination of the United States.

Importance of

SECRET

SECRET  
-100-

### Importance of Religion in Every-day Actions

The social habits of caste are reinforced by religion. In guiding every-day actions, how important do the Indians consider religious beliefs to be? "Very important", say two out of every three of the non-educated, and one out of two of the higher-educated older respondents. Only among the young college-educated was there widespread rejection of religious belief as a guide in everyday activities; in this group only one of four considers religious beliefs "very important," whereas almost half felt that they were of little or no importance.

The Communist Party, among the other parties shows perhaps the most interesting pattern in respect to political preference and voting. In the Lucknow sample, practically all those who preferred the Communist Party over the others were in the under-forty age groups. The greatest bulk of the pro-Communists, also, were among the higher-educated, particularly the college group. It would be dangerous to generalize for India as a whole from these findings, but one piece of corroborating evidence might be cited here: In an unpublished study done in eleven Indian universities at the same time that the Lucknow study was in progress, it was found that approximately 20 percent of the sample of students questioned indicated a preference for the Communist Party. This is, of course, far above the national average.

In respect to India as a whole and Uttar Pradesh as a State, the Communists polled about 4.5 per cent of the total vote for the Union Parliament and gained approximately the same proportion of the seats, making them the major opposition party. In Uttar Pradesh, the strong Congress area, they did much worse, polling less than half of one per cent of the total vote.

It is interesting to note in reference to the national vote of the Communist Party, that the proportion of seats won was even higher than the proportion of votes in the electorate. This is a very unusual occurrence in any but a "proportional representation" system of elections and may point to considerably more coordination of effort throughout India than is evidenced by any of the other minority parties. In all the other cases there was apparently considerably more "wasting" of votes for losing candidates.

### Awareness of Economic Problems

How much are the Lucknow residents aware of their economic poverty and, more generally, of the economic problems faced by the nation? There seems no doubt on this score. Respondents may or may not be aware of family or personal problems; they may or may not have felt repercussions of the

Hindu-Muslim

SECRET

SECRET

-101-

Hindu-Muslim tension (in Lucknow, the site of the present study, the communal tension was not severe); but they were fully aware of economic problems, both at the individual and national level. About three out of four Indians at all levels of education considered the economic problem to be the major problem faced by people who are in similar circumstances to them. Among the better-educated, a sizeable proportion of the respondents also thought in national terms and identified economic poverty as India's biggest problem, but for the least-educated (and poorest) respondents, it was primarily a personal issue.

The preoccupation of these respondents with economic problems was evident not only from the answers to those questions which dealt directly with this issue. When asked how they felt about India's newly gained independence, the immediate spontaneous joy at being "free from foreign bondage" was tempered for several respondents by the failure of the Indian National government to find a solution to economic ills. "Independence is good in the sense that the country is free but bad as the public is in trouble", says a 33-year old illiterate shop laborer. "It has meant hardship to us", says another illiterate Dhobi (washerman). Both were earning less than 60 rupees (\$12) a month.

SECRET

SECRET  
-102-

Stage II

- D. Do any particular factors affect the Indian attitude towards the use of force to resist aggression?

The irrational and pacifistic influence of Hinduism explain in measure the ready acceptance by the Indian peoples (especially the Hindu) the Gandhi creed of non-violence.

Hinduism in India and Buddhism in Ceylon have a fairly strong religious tradition opposed to the use of violence, and even the Islam of Pakistan, influenced by Shiite Muslim and by Hindu modes of thought, has a tradition of mysticism which emphasizes self-abnegation and opposes violence. Although these traditions of "non-violence" do not prevent the maintenance of armies in South Asia or the outbreak of actual conflicts such as the struggle between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, they do have an important influence on popular attitudes toward war.

The press and radio of India, Ceylon, and Pakistan frequently hark back to religious and moral ideals in condemning war. The Indian radio on the anniversary of the founding of the republic characterized the country's foreign policy as based on the ideal of world peace "preached by Buddha and the sages and saints of history down to Mahatma Gandhi" and declared that India "believes that war as a method of settling disputes between nations is morally wrong." From press comment it would appear that most of South Asia has been seriously impressed by Prime Minister Nehru's warnings of the horrors involved in a third world war and the need to make every effort to avert the danger "by negotiation or any other way -- provided it was peaceful."

However, despite a widespread dislike for the use of force, Indians would almost certainly actively resist aggression and defend their newly won freedom. Immediate military action, for example, was taken to halt the invasion of Kashmir by Pakistani tribesmen in 1947-48. There is also little hesitancy to use force to suppress internal threats to Indian security, such as the Communist revolt in Telengana during 1948.

SECRET

SECRET

-103-

Stage II

D.-1. How do they regard the army and military service?

The traditions of those units which served in the old British Indian Army have been carried forward to provide a morale base for the present forces. Indian troops exhibit great pride in the honors which have been awarded to their units. Since the establishment of independence, this feeling of pride has been further stimulated by military operations in the state of Hyderabad and in the state of Jammu and Kashmir (1947-1948), where for the first time senior Indian officers commanded and led troops in battle.

The prestige of the Armed Forces, .....is generally high. Especially in those communities such as the martial races of North India, the Gurkhas and the Sikhs, which have for generations sent their young men to serve in the Army. Large number of Hindus do not however. (80-5)

Top control of the Armed Forces rests in hands of civilian heads of Government in accordance with a tradition established under British rule. Nevertheless, political influence is present and under certain conditions it is conceivable a military dictatorship could emerge. (80-6)

SECRET

SECRET

-104-

Stage II

D-2. Have they experience or tradition of military action?

A. Practise in use of weapons?

The British trained an effective Indian army which attained a considerable size in World Wars I and II. However, India is not like a pioneer society in which all males are trained in the use of weapons.

B. Guerrilla warfare?

India is not without military traditions. These traditions stretch back into remote antiquity. Units which are now part of the Indian Army have served in British Indian units in many parts of the world. Some of the units participated in World Wars I and II. In World War I, Hindu and Sikh troops fought in France and the Middle East, while in World War II they participated in the Ethiopian, North African, Italian, Iraqi, and Burmese campaigns.

SECRET



SECRET

-105-

Stage II

- D-3. Are there cultural, ideological, or religious factors which condition Indian combativeness or martial spirit?

Religion exercises a powerful influence on the thought and conduct of the Indian people and is therefore of particular significance from a military point of view. The influence of Hinduism, the religion of some 75% of the population is largely irrational and pacifistic. Gandhian pacifism exercises a powerful influence upon the dominant Congress Party. Nevertheless, India is not without military traditions. (80-4)

Recent efforts to develop trained soldiers among the so-called non-martial communities appear to be meeting with some success, but it is still too early to state a final conclusion on this point. Morale is generally good, yet it would be unwise to assume that racial, religious, and caste intolerance have disappeared. (80-8)

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